University of Maine School of Law

University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2010

Following Industry's LEED : Municipal Adoption
of Private Green Building Standards
Sarah B. Schindler
University of Maine School of Law, sschindler@maine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/facultypublications
Part of the Architectural Engineering Commons, Architectural Technology Commons,
Construction Engineering Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Housing Law
Commons, Interior Architecture Commons, Law and Society Commons, Property Law and Real
Estate Commons, and the Urban, Community and Regional Planning Commons
Suggested Bluebook Citation
Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry's LEED : Municipal Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty-publications/20

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

Florida Law Review
Founded 1948
Formerly

University of Florida Law Review

VOLUME62

APRIL2010

NUMBER2

FOLLOWING INDUSTRY'S LEED®: MUNICIPAL ADOPTION OF
PRIVATE GREEN BUILDING STANDARDS

Sarah B. Schindler*
Abstract
Local governments are beginning to require new, privately constructed
and funded buildings to be "green" buildings. Instead of creating their own,
locally-derived definitions of green buildings, many municipalities are
adopting an existing private standard created by members of the building
industry: LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design). This
Article explains and assesses the privately promulgated LEED standards. It
argues that the translation of LEED standards, which were intended to be
voluntary, into law raises several theoretical and practical problems.
Specifically, private green building ordinances that rely on LEED do not
ensure a reduction in the negative local environmental impacts of
buildings, nor do they provide any assurance that those standards were
created through a legitimate process. The Article concludes by offering an
alternative approach, suggesting that municipalities should instead enact
green building ordinances that have been promulgated by public
governmental bodies, rather than private, industry-based organizations, and
done so locally, taking into account specific local building-related and
environmental concerns.
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I. INTRODUCTION: AN EMERGING TREND IN MUNICIPAL LAW

An old building with poor insulation and dripping faucets sits in the
middle of a busy, traditional downtown. It is close to a number of city bus
routes and an underground subway stop. It has no parking lot or structure
associated with it, and it is a short walk from a large city park. Across the
county, a brand-new energy-efficient commercial building has just been
constructed in the middle of a recently rezoned former plot of farmland. It
1
has a green roof and its large covered parking lot boasts a number of solar
panels. The nearest homes and stores are ten miles away, connected to this
new building by recently constructed roads and other infrastructure. Which
2
is the "greener" building? And more importantly, who should make that
decision?
Despite the impacts that buildings have on local, regional, and even
global ecosystems, governments have traditionally given surprisingly little
consideration to the way that buildings and building practices affect the
1. A green roof (also called a vegetated or living roof) is a roof covered with soil, vegetation,
and drainage mechanisms.
2. Green building has been defined as that which "relates to a facility's design, construction,
operation, or renovation, in which the waste generated is disposed of in an ecologically sound
manner." Nancy J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings: A
Comparative Law Approach Featuring the United States and the European Union, 23 VA. ENVlL
L.J. 397 , 404 (2005); see also Charles J. Kibert, Green Buildings: An Overview ofProgress, 19 J.
LAND USE & ENV1L. L. 491, 491-92 (2004) ("[F]acilities designed, built, operated, renovated, and
disposed of using ecological principles for the purpose of promoting occupant health and resource
efficiency plus minimizing the impacts of the built enviromnent on the natural environment.").
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environment. That oversight is unfortunate because their environmental
effects are dramatic. Construction and demolition waste make up
approximately one-third of all landfilled materials? Stormwater runoff
from roofs containing asbestos degrades local stream and river quality, as
does erosion and sediment from building construction practices. Buildings
and infrastructure contain up to 90% of all materials that have ever been
extracted from the environment, 4 and in the United States, buildings
consume nearly 40% of all primary energy. 5 On an even broader scale,
building construction activities and the energy used to operate those
buildings contribute more than any other source to man-made carbon
dioxide production, and thus to climate change. 6
Designing regulations to address sweeping environmental problems
such as climate change has not been easy nor, thus far, very successful.
Conventional wisdom suggests that a global regulatory solution is needed
to successfully address a global environmental problem such as climate
change. 7 However, a true global solution has yet to emerge. Governments
at the state and federal levels have attempted to reach consensus around
ideas for broad climate change legislation, with little success. 8 The focus
3. U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, CHARACTFRIZATION OFBUILDING-RElA1ED CONSTRUCTION
AND DEMOUTION DEBRIS IN Tiffi UNITED STATES 3 -1 (1998), available at
http://p2pays. org/ref/02/0 1095. pdf.
4. Kibert, supra note 2, at 493.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABlE ENERGY , 2008 BUilDINGS
ENERGY DATA BooK 1-3 (2008), available at http ://buildingsdatabook.eren. doe.gov/docs/DataB
ooks12008_BEDB. pdf [hereinafter 2008 BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BooK); U.S. DEP'TOFENERGY,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REviEW 2003, DOE/EIA-0384 36 (2003), available at
http://tonto. eia. doe. gov/FfPROOT/multifuel/038403. pdf; Charles J. Kibert, Policy Instruments for
a Sustainable Built Environment, 17 J. LAND UsE& ENVTLL 379, 379, 381 (2002).
6. 2008 BUilDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK, supra note 5, at 1-30; see alsoTHEMAYOR'STASK
FORCE ON GREEN BUilDING FOR Tiffi CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2007), available at http: //www.sfenvironment.org/downloads/library/gbt
frrreleasev 1.3. pdf [hereinafter MAYOR' STASK FORCE REPORT, SAN FRANCISCO] ("As the City looks
at a broad range of policies and programs to improve sustainability, it recognizes that buildings are
the number one contributor to man-made CO! production (greater than transportation and industrial
sources), and have significant impacts on air quality, landfill , transportation, energy consumption,
resource use, and occupant health and productivity.").
7. Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R Saleska, Sub global Regulation ofthe Global Commons: The
Case ofClimate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 187 ( 2005).
8. Although the landscape in this area is rapidly changing, a number of federal climate
change bills have been proposed but failed to pass. For example, the Lieberman-McCain Climate
Stewardship Act was brought before the Senate in 2003 as a bipartisan effort toward a nationwide
climate change policy. Lieberman-McCain Climate Stewardship Act, S. 139, 1 08th Cong. (2003 ).
Among other things, the Act would have required the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency to implement regulations that would limit the amount of greenhouse gas
emissions from various sectors of the economy (accountable for approximately 85% of U.S.
emissions in the year 2000), with the goal of capping the 2010 aggregate emissions level at the 2000
level. /d. § 316; see Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Summary of the Lieberman-McCain
Climate Stewardship Act, http: //www. pewclimate. org/policy_center/analyses/s_l3 9 _summary. cfm
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has thus shifted to how environmental impacts can be addressed at more
discrete levels, such as by regulating buildings.
In recent years, a uniform, nationally promulgated private regulatory
scheme has be%un taking hold: Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED") green building standards, developed by the United States
Green Building Council (USGBC). Many of the early adopters of this
9
privately created regulatory scheme have been municipalities. Because
local governments are typically responsible for issuing discretionary
permits for the construction of new buildings, they are easily able to
10
require additional regulation of private development projects. By
imposing green building requirements on private developers, local
(last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (summarizing bill). Even after a revised version was proposed to amend
the original bill, it still failed by a vote of 43 to 55. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 108th
Proposals in Detail (l ), http: //www. pewclimate. org/what_s_being_done/in_ the_congress/1 08th
v2.cfm#emissionlimits (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). Similarly, a 2008 attempt at federal climate
change policy, the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, also failed after being debated.
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, llOth Cong. (2008); see also Eric
Pooley,
Why the Climate Bill Failed, TIME, June 9, 2008, available at
http: //www. time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599, 1812836,00.html (discussing the Lieberman
Warner Climate Security Act's failure to pass). States are not immune to the problems in passing
climate change legislation. Indeed, California, often thought to be on the more liberal and
progressive end of environmental issues, has recently seen several bills aimed at environmental
protection fail as a result of Governor Schwarzenegger's veto power. See Press Release, Natural
Res. Def. Council, A Mixed Finish for 2008 Environmental Bills in California, Says NRDC (Oct.
10, 2008), available at http: //www.nrdc.org/media/2008/081010.asp (listing signed and vetoed
environmental bills in California in 2008 and highlighting Governor Schwarzenegger' s veto of SB
974, which would have substantially helped reduce air pollution produced by California's ports).
9. See, e.g., Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), Texas
Incentives/Policies for Renewables and Efficiency, Austin-Green Building Requirement for City
Projects, http ://www. dsireusa. org/library /includeslincentive2. cfm?Incentive_Code=TX 14R&O.Ir
rentPageiD=l&RE=l&EE=l (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (providing information on June 2000
adoption of LEED standards in Austin, Texas); SANTAMONICACITY STAFF, REPoRTTOMAYORAND
CITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDING APPROVAL OF GREEN BUILDING GRANT PROGRAM AND INNOVATIVE
TECHNOLOGY GRANT PROGRAM (2004 ), available at http ://wwwOl.smgov.net/cityclerklcouncil/agen
das/2004/20040113/ s2004011308-B.htm (providing history of Santa Monica Green Building
incentives and noting that "the City Council adopted a policy effective July 1, 2001, that requires all
new construction and major renovations of City facilities to meet the Silver level ofLEED wherever
feasible"); City of Seattle Dep't of Planning & Dev., City Green Building: Seattle's Policy &
Progress, http :1/www. cityofseattle. net/dpd/GreenB uilding/CapitalProjectsl SeattlesPolicyI default. asp
(last visited Jan. 24, 20 10) (noting Seattle's 2000 adoption of a Sustainable Building Policy, which
requires LEED silver certification for all new city-funded projects and certain renovations;
providing link to text of policy). In the United States, local governments have typically regulated
public land use. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROL: CASES AND
MATERIALS34 (2d ed. 2000). There are multiple forms oflocal governments that engage in land use
regulations, including counties, municipalities, towns, townships, and special districts. !d. Although
each form is distinct, throughout this Article for ease of readability, the terms for the different local
governmental units will be used interchangeably.
10. This is still a nascent trend, though one that is growing. Many of the ordinances that have
been adopted have not yet gone into effect.
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governments are attempting to limit local environmental externalities
created by building construction and operation. The climate change
benefits of those buildings are a bonus that piggybacks onto local benefits.
While the encouragement of green buildings at the local level is
certainly a step in the right direction toward lessening the negative
environmental impacts of buildings, ordinances that force private
developers to comply with uniform standards developed by a private
building-industry organization are fraught with practical and legal
11
problems that have not been fully explored in scholarly literature. This
Article analyzes from a normative and legal perspective this emerging
green building regulatory regime. It cautions against local requirements
that force private developers to comply with nationally promulgated,
private, voluntary LEED standards as opposed to publicly created local
ones.
At the most general level, this Article is concerned with the fact that
municipalities are allowing unelected members of a private, industry
centered organization to promulgate-and in some cases enforce
standards that restrict what a property owner may do with her property and
hinder the community's ability to ensure the healthiest possible
environment. Incorporating such private regulations into the law fails to
achieve what should be the two fundamental goals ofa new green building
regime: (1) efficacy and (2) legitimate process. This Article uses "efficacy"
to mean that a green building regime should cost-effectively ensure that
green building measures are strong enough to reduce key local

11. At this point, most legal commentators have simply stated that incorporating standards,
such as the LEED standards, into building and planning codes is not a good idea, without offering
detailed discussions as to why. See Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote
Sustainable Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State
Land Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 731, 747 (2008) ("Standards of this nature [such
as LEED] are not good candidates to incorporate into building codes or other mandatory regulations
and are best left to voluntary industry initiatives."); Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note, Making it Easy to
Be Green: Using Impact Fees to Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y. U. L. REv. 532, 548 (2008)
("Despite the clear effectiveness of building requirements, however, an abundance of literature
suggests that such requirements have negative effects on development."). While these concerns
have by and large been ignored by academic and legal commentators, some state and local
government players have noted their concerns. See, e.g. , Dan Walters, Private Law Undercuts
Democracy , SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 6, 2007 , atA3, available at 2007 WLNR 15102662 ("By all
accounts, USGBC [(the entity that promulgates the LEED standards)) is a legitimate organization
that acts as a forum for agreements on environmentally friendly building standards. But it's not the
only organization doing that work. At any rate, the standards it decrees and the methods it uses to
draft those decrees are matters of its internal politics-including influence from those who support
it financially-and are shielded from input by the outside world. Under [a proposed state Green
Building bill], California taxpayers would be on the hook for whatever standards USGBC
developed by whatever process it uses. Were this an isolated case, it might merit a pass, but it's part
of a broader legislative tendency to avoid tough policy decisions by shifting them to unaccountable
outside organizations.").
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12

environmental externalities caused by buildings. This Article uses
"legitimate process" to mean the regime should ensure that the regulations
implemented by local governments are subject to a promulgation and
enforcement process that contains elements of transparency, democracy,
and openness to public participation or that provides notice and an
opportunity for voice and exit. 13 Although any action that in fact lessens
the environmental harm caused by building practices and operation
represents a good first step, the goals of efficacy and legitimate process
will not be met if cities continue to rely on privately developed LEED
standards as the centerpiece of their green building regulations.
Part II of this Article analyzes issues of scale and considers whether
green building requirements should be imposed at a local, national, or
international level. One purpose of green building ordinances is to reduce
14
the harmful effects of global warming.
Because climate change is a global problem, many commentators
contend that it must be addressed at an international or transnational level.
While there is some merit to this claim from a policy perspective, buildings
do not only contribute to the global climate change problem, but also result
in numerous local externalities and environmental harms, such as water
and energy over-consumption, poor river quality due to erosion and
sedimentation, and degraded indoor and outdoor air quality. These local
problems, which vary from region to region, are best addressed at a local
level, from both an efficacy and legitimate process standpoint. Moreover,
local governments have already begun to take action by enacting private
green building mandates in the face of inaction at the national and
international level.
Part III presents a descriptive analysis of LEED's role in furthering
green building practices and its recent co-option by municipalities. This
Part begins by providing background on LEED green building standards.
Among the municipalities that have decided to require private development
projects to be "green buildings" or include green design elements, the most
common method of regulation is to require the developer to demonstrate
15
that its building could achieve LEED certification. Part III also provides
12. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YAlE L. & PoL' Y REv. 23, 25
(1996 ) ("A fundamental issue is how to allocate regulatory authority so that political institutions
and processes will yield policies that achieve the optimal or efficient level of pollution without
imposing unnecessary costs on productive economic activity.").
13. Voice is the ability to influence a political process through active participation, while exit
is aggressive nonparticipation in the process, such as the ability not to comply with a regulation.
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL, PROPERTY 1064 (6th ed. 2006). See also WIW AM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, E CONOMICS, AND Pouncs ( 1995).
14. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
15. These ordinances come in the form of new chapters or sections in zoning or planning
codes, as well as in building co des.
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background on the emergence, composition, and practices ofthe entity that
created the LEED green building standards, the USGBC: a national, non
profit organization comprisin~ members ofthe building industry and others
1
interested in green building. Finally, this Part explains LEED as it was
meant to operate- as a private, voluntary market mechanism- and analyze
why municipalities have decided to adopt it into their codes.
Part IV begins an analysis of the form and content of private municipal
green building mandates by first laying out the twin goals of a green
building regime: efficacy and legitimate process. Next, this Part describes a
spectrum of possible approaches to development and enforcement of green
building standards, ranging from purely public to purely private. Using this
framework, Part IV analyzes the type of green building regime that would
best achieve the goals of efficacy and legitimate process.
Part V focuses on the content ofLEED-based green building ordinances
with respect to the first regime goal: efficacy. This Part first argues that
cities should promulgate green building requirements locally, taking into
account specific local building-related and environmental concerns. Part V
then addresses the need for public bodies to be more cognizant of
translation problems that are involved in borrowing private rules. Finally,
this Part argues that allowing private, industry-based organizations to
promulgate standards that bind their own industries is not the most
efficacious manner in which to ensure the strongest cost-effective
environmental protection measures. Specifically, industry-derived uniform
regulations tend to be inflexible and are often set too low to achieve real
benefits.
Part VI turns to the means by which LEED-based green building
ordinances are promulgated and the second regime goal: legitimate
process. This Part raises concerns that the LEED promulgation process is
not legitimate when translated from a voluntary standard to a mandate. A
public process for developing standards would better address process
concerns, including democracy, transparency, notice, voice, and exit.
Finally, Part VI addresses the fact that private entities are not subject to the
same open government requirements as are public agencies, and thus a
public standards-development process would foster a more legitimate
regulatory process.

16. U.S. Green Building Council. About USGBC. http: //www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?
CMSPageiD=l24 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The USGBC is a fine example of what some refer to
as "quangos" -quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations. See Clark Havighurst,
Foreword: the Place of Private Accrediting Among the Instruments of Government. 57 LAW &
CoNIEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (1994); see also King & King, supra note 2 , at 406 ("In a classic example of
industry self-regulation, members of the (USGBC), composed of representatives of all segments of
the U.S. building industry, developed consensus-based national standards for use in constructing
high-performance, sustainable buildings.").
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This Article concludes by explaining that a city, once having adopted a
LEED-based green building ordinance, will falsely believe that it has
sufficiently addressed its environmental concerns. In reality, this "solution"
sticks a band-aid on a major wound , calls the process successful, and stops
there. To avoid such a problem, this Article poses alternative formulations
for private municipal green building ordinances: If cities are going to
create a green building regime based on requirements, rather than
incentives, they should promulgate those requirements locally, taking into
account specific local building-related and environmental concerns.
Moreover, the development should take place under the auspices of public
governmental bodies, not private, industry-based organizations. Using
these methods will result in a green building requirements regime that
ensures stronger protection against climate change and local environmental
harms, as well as a transparent and democratic governmental process
resistant to industry capture.

II.

FEDERALISM AND THE GLOBAL COMMONS-THE APPROPRIATE
SCALE OF GREEN BUILDING REGULATION

A. Legal Background: A Local Government's Ability to Regulate

Land use is an area of the law traditionally regulated by local
governments through zoning, planning, subdivision, or building codes. 17 A
munici gality is able to regulate an individual's use of her land via its police
power. 8 Historically, governments use their police power to restrict private
rights in the interests of health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 19
Municipalities apply this Rolice power to private real property through
zoning and building codes. 20
Notwithstanding their police power, local governments are still subject
to sometimes ineffective national and state initiatives. However, with
respect to the issue of climate change, for example, little cohesive action
has been taken at either the federal or state level to combat the problem.
Building practices, which contribute to climate change, also contribute to
numerous local environmental issues, including air and water quality,
stormwater management, and landfill space for construction waste, to
name a few. Thus, local governments have begun to step in to tackle these
Issues.
17 . E LUCKSON & BEEN, supra note 9, at 34.
18. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). The police power offers sufficient
justification for governmental involvement in and oversight of green building requirements. See
Circa , supra note 11, at 744.
19. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33 ("The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.") (internal
citations omitted).
20. E LU CKSON & BEEN, supra note 9 , at 86.
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Local zoning regulations were initially created to address public health
21
issues in growing cities. Similarly, the new trend of requiring green
building elements in the construction of new buildings is grounded in
health concerns for both citizens and the environment, resulting from
climate change as well as a variety of local environmental externalities
22
related to building construction.
B. Scale: International, National, or Local Regulation

Before considering the twin goals of efficacy and legitimate process,
various issues of scale must be examined to determine what level of
government is best suited to impose green building requirements on private
developers, including the scale of externalities (local, regional, national,
and global) and the scale of expertise (national problems require experts
with nationwide experience, whereas local problems require local
knowledge and experience). Although the larger issue of concern, climate
change, is certainly an international problem, the burdens placed on
developers and a building's impact are inherently local issues.
1. An International or National System Will Not Sufficiently
Address Local Environmental Impairments
If you were to ask local government officials why their cities adopted
green building ordinances, you would likely hear that they wanted to be at
the vanguard of the environmental and climate change reduction
movements. 23 Indeed, as one commentator notes, "[t]he key underlying
21. See, e.g., § 1 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act passed by Hoover's Commerce
Department in the early decades of the twentieth century which stated,
[s]uch regulations [are] ... designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure
safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding ofland; to
facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks,
and other public requirements.
22. See, e.g., PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.90.020 (2009), available at
http: I/library.m unicode. com/index. aspx ?clientiD= 16551 &sta teiD=5&stateName=Califomia. ("[I]t
is the purpose of this [Green Building Practices] chapter to ... [i]mprove the health of residents,
visitors, and workers by counteracting negative environmental impacts associated with building
construction and occupation."); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., BUIIJ)ING CODE ch. 13C, § 1301 C (2009),
availableathttp: //www.amlegal.com/nx Ugateway.dll?f=templates&fn=defaulthtm&vid=amlegal:
sf_building ("The purpose of this chapter [imposing green building requirements on private
development] is to promote the health, safety and welfare of San Francisco residents, workers, and
visitors by minimizing the use and waste of energy, water and other resources in the construction
and operation of the City and County of San Francisco's building stock and by providing a healthy
indoor environment.").
23. See also PALO ALTO, CAL. , MUN. CODE, ch. 18.44 (2009); Palo Alto , Cal. Ordinance No.
5006 (June 2, 2008), available at http ://www.cityofpaloalto.org/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?b
lobid=l 77 19 ("The City's Climate Protection Plan (CPP). . identifies green building as an
important approach to reducing greenhouse gases generated in the Palo Alto community. The CPP
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24

issue motivating green building work[] is the threat of climate change. "
Buildings account for approximately 39% of all energy used in the United
States, 38% of greenhouse gas emissions, 40% of raw materials used, and
25
14% of potable water consumption. Further, it is undeniable that climate
26
change is a problem of global proportions. This has led some legal
commentators to state that only a global-level approach can solve this
global problem, and thus local governments (and even states or individual
countries) should not take independent action without an international
. p1ace. 27
mandate m
Support for this bias against local action in the climate change context
is typically supplied by two theories: ( 1) the "Matching Principle, " which
holds that "the size of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution
source should determine the appropriate governmental level for responding
to the pollution" and suggests that international action is required to
28
address the global climate change crisis; or (2) a "race to the bottom"
theory-a concern that, in the absence of an international or federal
requirement, state and local governments will lower the level of
environmental protection that is required by industries within their
29
jurisdictions in an attempt to attract those industries.
These theories, which have been thoroughly analyzed in the literature
30
with respect to environmental pollution, are underpinned by a general
notes that building construction and maintenance accounts for approximately 38% of U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions (U.S. Department of Energy) and approximately 40% of the energy use in
the Palo Alto community. Buildings also account for much of the 14% of emissions that are
generated by waste materials.'').
24. Bradford Swing, Project-Based Policy Development: Building the Case for Boston's
Green Building Policy, 11 N.Y. U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. PoL'Y 33, 50 (2008).
25. U.S. Green Bldg. Council, Green Building Facts 1 (2009), available at
http://www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=5961.
26. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7, at 184 (referring to climate change as "perhaps the
foremost global commons problem facing the world today").
27. Engel & Saleska, supranote7, at 187; RobertN. Stavins, PolicyinstrumentsforClimate
Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293.
28. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 25 (noting that the geographic size determines the level
of governmental spending as "[t]here is no need for the regulating jurisdiction to be larger than the
regulated activity"); see also Engel & Saleska, supra note 7, at 187.
29. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to -the
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y. U. L. REv. 1210, 1210 (1992);
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation ofNational Environmental Policy, 86 Y ALEL.J. 1196, 1212 (1977).
30. See generally David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796 (2008)
(discussing race to the bottom and Matching Principle, ultimately rejecting Matching Principle in
favor of an adaptive model for environmental regulation); Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a
Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENV1L. L.
REv. 67 (2007 ) (discussing race to the bottom theory as a factor that affects a state's regulatory
scheme); Butler & Macey, supra note 12 (criticizing race to the bottom theory and developing
Matching Principle); Stewart, supra note 29 (reflecting seminal work arguing in favor of federal
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"tragedy of the commons" argument: rational, individual local
governments should have no incentive to take action against climate
change when that action will not have a measurable impact on the larger
climate change problem and will instead result in a decrease in their
benefits from the commons because they have to bear the costs of the
1
regulations? While there is general consensus about these issues in the
broadest sense, some commentators suggest that unilateral action against
32
climate change by actors on a smaller scale can still make sense.
Although buildings certainly contribute to the global climate change
problem, they more specifically and immediately result in local
environmental externalities, including sedimentation and erosion caused by
runoff, landfill overuse due to construction and demolition debris, and
deleterious effects on public health? 3 These intrinsically local problems
vary from area to area and thus require a localized understanding of and
expertise about how buildings relate to and impact the local environment.
Indeed, both the Matching Principle and the race to the bottom theory can
be used to support this assertion.
2. The Matching Principle and Local Action
The Matching Principle holds that the regulating jurisdiction should not
be larger than the regulated activity. 34 When addressing problems of
climate change, most commentators focus on global warming as a global
concern and reason that an international (or at least national) response is
necessary? 5 However, Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey, who devised the
Matching Principle, believed that "many important environmental
problems are problems of purely local concern, and should be regulated at
the local level. "3 6 In fact, when there are "purely local externalities," Butler
and Macey state unequivocally that those should be dealt with locally?7
Determining whether the externalities that result from buildings are
environmental regulation, pointing out a race to the bottom as one rationale in favor of the
centralization of policy).
31. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 190-91.
32. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 188; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal
Mart Effect: The Role ofPrivate Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REv. 913, 964--
65 (2007 ) ("[T]he national and international public law regime on its o wn has been unable to
. Development and
address a number of environmental problems that pose grave threats.
enforcement of multilateral international regulatory requirements has been difficult.").
33. These are costs that are external to the builder or developer, and are often entirely
absorbed by the locality.
34. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 25.
35. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 187 ("With respect to global environmental problems
such as global climate change or ozone depletion, the 'matching principle' calls for an international
framework of response ...." ).
36. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 26.
37 . Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 32.
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purely local is difficult because buildings do not fit neatly into the silo of
ambient environmental polluters that are traditionally analyzed under these
theories. Stationary sources of pollution, such as factories releasing sulfur
dioxide or landfills that cause seepage and groundwater pollution, directly
contribute to local externalities in ways that buildings do not. Further,
those types of polluters exist and regulations aim to reduce their pollution
contribution, whereas green building requirements are forward-looking,
and dictate the way that new (currently non-existing) buildings will be
constructed. However, by looking at existing green building regulations
and which features of buildings they seek to change, we can work
backwards to discover some of the environmental harms that result from
buildings and that have an impact on those not receiving any benefits from
the buildings.
Traditional, older, "non-green" buildings often negatively impact
localities in numerous ways. In drought-prone areas, older buildings with
leaky sinks and a lack of low-flow plumbing fixtures use water in
unsustainable ways. Similarly, over their lifetimes, older buildings
consume dramatically more energy than new, energy-efficient buildings
especially new green buildings designed with energy-conservation
38
principles in mind. Additionally, many older buildings contain paints and
coatings with high levels of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), which
negatively contribute to indoor air quality, and thus adversely impact the
9
health of building occupants? Further, in many cities, buildings have been
located and positioned in ways that result in substantial shadow impacts,
40
thus depriving citizens of the sun.
New building practices also result in substantial environmental
externalities. In many localities, instead of locating large commercial
buildings downtown, zoning codes place them in suburban corporate
41
campus environments, isolating them from homes and parks.
38. Interestingly, buildings located in different parts of the country have different levels of
C02 emissions based on the source of their electricity. Many buildings in the Northwest use
electricity produced from hydropower, which results in fewer c~ emissions than many buildings in
the Midwest that use electricity from coal. See Energy Star, Carbon Emissions from Building
Energy Use, http :1/www. energystar. gov/index. cfm?c=evaluate_performance. bus _portfoliomanager_
carbon (last visited Jan. 24, 20 10).
39. Environmental Protection Agency, An Introduction to Indoor Air Quality,
http://www.epa.gov/iaq/voc.htrul (last visited Jan. 24, 2010 ). Some might question whether this is
actually an externality, as the building occupants do also obtain some benefits from use of the
building. Ho wever, the building occupants, such as workers, do not get any of the profits from
purchasing or owning the building. Thus, their sufferings are properly considered externalities.
40. To avoid this problem, some localities require shadow studies prior to approving a
project. See, e.g., CITY OF Los ANGElES, CEQA THRESHOLDS GUIDE A.3-2 (2006), available at
http: II environmentla. org/programs/Thresholds/A-Aesthetics%2 Oand%20 Visual%20Resources. pdf
("A project impact would normally be considered significant if shadow-sensitive uses would be
shaded by project-related structures for more than three hours...."').
41. Charles Lockwood, Building the Green Way, HARV. Bus. REv. , June 2006, at 129, 132.
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Commercial buildings so located are typically far from public transit,
requiring multiple individual car trips in order to reach the buildings,
which in turn contributes to the consumption of more fossil fuel and
42
emissions release. These buildin,5s also often seem inauthentic, resulting
in areas that lack a sense of place. Finally, an abundance of waste results
from the construction of new buildings, most of which is not recycled or
44
reused, and thus ends up in locallandfills. These are only a few of the
many types of local environmental externalities that buildings impose on
citizens living in or near them, which cities would like to eliminate or
45
decrease via the imposition of green building requirements. Because
these building-related externalities are inherently local, pursuant to the
Matching Principle, they should be addressed at the local level. Moreover,
as evidenced by the chart below, the scale of local environmental
externalities caused by buildings swamps those at the regional, national,
and global levels.

A Sample ofBuildinR-Related Environmental Externalities
Local

Regional

National

46

Global

High and inefficient water usage by Air quality impacts
older buildings depletes a locality's due to automobile
travel to and from
water supply
buildings

Depletion of
Climate Change/greenhouse
naturally occurring gas emissions
building materials,
including forests

Local stream and river quality
impacts due to effluent and

Manufacture and
transportation of

River quality
impacts due to

42. /d. at 132.
43. Studies have shown negative psychological impacts on workers and worker satisfaction as
a result of their physical surroundings. In contrast, studies show that workers in green buildings are
typically happier and healthier, both physically and mentally. See id. at 130 (citing studies that
found up to a fifteen percent increase in employee productivity, less sick time, and increased morale
and employee satisfaction in green buildings).
44. See id. at 129 (discussing the benefits of green building over standard building because
green construction recycles building waste).
45. As an example, the "driving force" behind Washington D.C.'s adoption of a private green
building requirement was to improve their local environmental conditions, including heat island
effect, storm water runoff contributing to deplorable river quality conditions, and poor air quality.
Telephone Interview with Zach Dobelbower, D.C. Neighborhood Plauning Coordinator, Ward 2
Member of Green Building Task Force (Oct. 9 , 2008); see also PALO ALTO, CAL, MUN. CODE, ch.
18.44 (2009); Palo Alto, Cal. Ordinance No. 5006 (June 2 , 2008) , available at
http://www. cityofpaloalto. org/civica/filebank/blobdload. asp?blobid= 177 19 ("[ G]reen building
design, construction, restoration, operation, and maintenance can have a significant positive effect
on energy, water, and resource conservation, waste management and pollution generation, and the
health and productivity of a property's residents, workers, and visitors over the life of a building
and/or site. " ).
46. As the title of this table makes clear, it contains only a sample of the myriad externalities
that result from building construction. Further, though some of the externalities listed as local may,
on a larger scale, result in additional regional externalities as well, those effects would be minimal
in relation to the substantial local effects.
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effluent and
storm water runoff (including
stormwater runoff
runoff from roofs that contain
asbestos or petroleum materials)
Runoff from synthetic materials is
faster than runoff from natural
surfaces, resulting in more erosion
and sedimentation
Development near groundwater
recharge areas results in
I _groundwater pollution
Buildings consume large amounts
of available local energy supply
Local zoning results in separation
of uses, necessitating automobile
trips, resulting in consumption of
local supplies of petroleum and
release of emissions
Local zoning results in uses that are
far from public transit,
necessitating automobile trips,
resulting in consumption of local
supplies of petroleum and release
of emissions
Local zoning results in separation
of uses, which results in
construction of more, longer, and
less efficient infrastructure, which
uses more materials (pipes,
concrete) and causes more
construction impacts
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synthetic building
materials

Local zoning may result in
communities that lack a sense of
place due to the location of
buildings and mix of uses
Indoor air quality impacts due to
high-VOC paints and coatings
Construction and demolition waste
winds up in local landfills
Heat Island Effect

Of course, not every city's buildings have these same problems. For
example, cities in the wet Pacific Northwest have fewer water conservation
concerns for their buildings than do cities in the dry Nevada desert.
Similarly, the Manhattans and San Franciscos of the country do not have
corporate campus-type developments within their city limits that are far
from public transit. The opposite is true for suburbs like Alpharetta,
Georgia or Round Rock, Texas. These distinct characteristics further
illustrate the need for local, individualized regulation to alleviate specific,
local environmental concerns.
Thus, any attempt to apply a nationwide green building "solution" to
these problems would result in cities with fewer building-related

300

FWRIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 62

externalities being forced to bear the same costs as those cities with more
47
problems without receiving the same corresponding benefits. This is an
inherent problem with reliance on a uniform nationwide set of green
building standards: the fundamental determinations of what constitutes a
"green building" will be decided by a single entity without any specific
consideration given to the unique environmental, social, and political
concerns of different localities. To prevent the development of new
buildings that continue to contribute to these localized externalities, local
governments should develop individualized green building programs that
seek to address and avoid their local problems as well as the larger
problem of climate change.
In summary, requiring a single building to incorporate green elements
may reduce local environmental externalities, but it will not reduce levels
of global warming because the impact would be so small as to be de
minimis. On the other hand, national regulation aimed at all buildings is
not tailored enough to address specific local environmental externalities,
but it might reduce levels of global warming. However, as evidenced by
the chart above, a desire to minimize the large number of local
environmental externalities that result from buildings gives local
governments a strong enough incentive to take action themselves to require
48
more environmentally friendly building construction practices. This self
interest on the part of localities will solve any coordination problem, and
the positive aggregate impacts on climate change resulting from these
green building ordinances will piggyback onto the specifically local
49
benefits. Thus, we must consider the localized benefits of green building,
such as conserving local supplies of water and energy, encouraging the use
and reuse of local building materials and supplies, contributing to better
indoor and outdoor environmental air quality, healthier city residents, and
50
happier building occupants. These are inherently local responses to
purely local concerns, and thus, pursuant to the Matching Principle, a local
1
regulatory scheme should address these issues. 5

47. Butler & Macey. supra note 12, at 55.
48. This is, perhaps, the reason that so many municipalities have begun to voluntarily adopt
green building ordinances.
49. Although a global or national solution to climate change will not necessarily have any
positive impacts on local environmental problems, a local solution to environmental problems will,
in the aggregate, have a positive impact on larger, global problems.
50. Building design impacts not only a city's form, but also its energy consumption, the
health of its indoor air, and the people who work and live in these buildings. See Lockwood, supra
note 41, at 130.
51. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 31 ("Allo cation of regulatory authority over local
externalities to local governments allows decisions to be made by the representatives of the citizens
who benefit the most from and pay the most for higher environmental quality.").
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3. The Race to the Bottom and Local Action
Notwithstanding the Matching Principle, one justification often used to
support a larger, national approach to environmental concerns (instead of a
piecemeal local one) is that of preventing a "race to the bottom. " 52 For
example, if City A passes a strict, local, environmentally related zoning
ordinance, but City B does not, a developer would have an incentive to
take her business to City B to avoid having to comply with City A's
ordinance, thereby saving herself money. 53
Race-to-the-bottom theorists hold that national regulations equal~
applicable to all regulatees, regardless of location, avoid this problem. 4
Thus, one possible benefit of a national green building standard would be
that it would alleviate the race to the bottom. 55 Similarly, a nationally
promulgated green building standard would equalize green building
requirements. This would be good because it would normalize developers'
expectations; they would understand what a "green building" was and if
they built one in City C, they could follow the same methods in City D.
Further, national standards would benefit building product manufacturers,
who often sell their products on a national market, and would benefit
builders who work across regions or nationwide.
Despite these purported benefits of federal-level environmental and
green building regulation, literature also suggests that the race to the
bottom is not, in fact, determinative, and that states and cities will enact
stringent regulations even when a federal mandate is lacking. 56 Indeed, an
individual or industry is not solely concerned with the taxes it will have to
pay and expenses related to building standards, but also with what "bundle
of services" it will receive from locating in a city, such as open space,
public services, and cultural opportunities. 57 Further, commentators have
noted that local governments do not all reason in the same way when
52. This theory suggests that federal environmental regulation is necessary to prevent states,
who are in competition for industry, from setting pollution control standards that are not stringent
enough; "a race from the desirable levels of environmental quality that states would pursue if they
did not face competition for industry to the increasingly undesirable levels that they choose in the
face of such competition." Revesz, supra note 29, at 1210. The theory is also used as a basis for
declaring local environmental regulation as inadequate. See Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 34.
53. This would result in a loss ofjobs and tax revenue to City A, which would then consider
repealing the strict ordinance. See Revesz, supra n o te 29 , at 1216.
54. Revesz , supra note 29, at 121 7 .
55. Revesz, supra note 29 , at 121 7 .
56. Revesz, supra note 29, at 1233 ("[T]here is no support in the theoretical literature on
interjurisdictional competition for the claim that, withou t federal intervention, there will be a race to
the bottom over environmental standards."); Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski , Racing to the
Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001, 50 AM. J. PoL Sc r. 350,352 (2006)
("While NGOs typically claim races to the bottom are quite common, scholars have found little
empirical support for them.") (citations omitted).
57 . Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Po L Ec oN. 41 6 , 419
(1956 ), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1 826343.
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imposing environmental standards. 58 Thus, with respect to green buildings,
the race to the bottom does not provide determinative support for an
exclusively national or international regime.
Typically, developers choose locations for specific, economic-driven
reasons. A building located in San Francisco will likely be more expensive
to permit and erect than a building constructed in Bowling Green,
Kentucky. However, the building in San Francisco will also be able to take
in higher rents, will likely have a higher occupancy rate, and will be
situated in a location that provides access to numerous public parks, transit,
and cosmopolitan and business opportunities. This illustrates the
importance that locality plays when a developer is making a decision about
which market to enter. Unlike pure environmental pollution regulations,
green building ordinances are, at base, land use regulations. The race to the
bottom justification for federal environmental laws has never gained much
traction in suggesting that land use regulation should be conducted at a
national level. This is because land use issues are inherently local issues,
impacting citizens in ways that sweeping environmental legislation (and
problems) does not. Thus, unlike some other types ofenvironmental issues
that could conceivably result in a race to the bottom, because locality is so
important to the construction of buildings, local regulations are more
59
favorable than national ones.
Despite the line of theorists that point to global and national-level
solutions to the problem of climate change, the foregoing analysis supports
a conclusion that local government regulation is more appropriate to
handle the more nuanced, specifically local externalities that buildings
60
force onto their local communities. This local emphasis comports with
58. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 43-44 ("Localities have different preferences for
environmental quality, for a variety of economic and aesthetic reasons, and it is not at all clear that
competition between jurisdictions will lead to a lowerlevel of environmental quality than would a
national median voter mo del.").
59. Indeed, if we look at the way green building regulations are playing out in cities and
counties across the country , we see no evidence of a race to the bottom. In the nascent green
building arena, cities are requiring green buildings from private developers in the absence of federal
regulations. More generally, many states have set environmental regulations that are stricter than
those imposed by federal environmental programs. See, e.g. , Clean Air Act§ 209(a), (b), (e) , 42
U.S. C. § 7 543 (2006); Colorado Hazardous Waste Regulations, 6 Co LO. CODE REGs. 1007 -3,
§ 261.5(f)(3)(iv) (2009) (noting no onsite-disposal by conditionally exemptsmall quantity
generators); see also Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global
Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes
and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENV1L. L. REv. 15, 16 (2004) ("[M]an y states and
localities are responding to the lack of federal leadership on the issue of climate change by
establishing their own programs to limit emissions of greenhouse gases(' GHGs') and to sequester
those gases.").
60. See supra Part II.B.2. (referencing table titled "A Sample of Building-Related
Environmental Ex ternalities" which demonstrates that there are numerous local externalities and a
paucity of regional, national, or global ones).
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traditional notions of federalism and is consistent with the Matching
Principle.

61

Finally, as will be discussed in more detail below, local

governments are in fact taking action to regulate these issues at a local
level. However, this analysis also cautions that those local governments
should refrain from importing nationally developed green building
standards into their local codes without first taking into consideration the
local externalities addressed above. To do otherwise is to allow national
regulation of a predominantly local problem.

III.

TAKE ME TOY OUR LEEDER: WHO DEVELOPED LEED GREEN
BUILDING STANDARDS AND WHY?

A. The United States Green Building Council (USGBC/

2

The USGBC was founded by building industry stakeholders who were
interested in developing green buildings.

63

While membership today is

more diverse, the organization is still primarily populated by building
industry insiders.

64

LEED is a "Green Building Rating System;" a third

61. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 53 ("Traditional federalism theory tells us that local
government regulation should be preferred whenever appropriate so that regulations reflect the
environmental-quality preferences of the affected parties, as well as to allow for jmisdictional
competition and diversity."). The LEED approach removes the benefits of competition and
diversity, and instead separates localities only based on whether they do or do not impose green
building standards on private developments.
62. The USGBC is a 50 l(c)(3) non-profit corporation that was formed in April of 1993. DuN
& BRADSTREET, CORPORATE FiliNG, U.S. GREEN BUiilllNG COUNCIL, INC. (filed Apr. 6, 1993) (on
file with author). The organization's stated purpose is "transform the way buildings and
communities are designed, built and operated, enabling an environmentally and socially
responsible, healthy, and prosperous environment that improves the quality of life." About USBGC,
http: //www. usgbc. org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=l24 (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
63. Certainly, it was a subset of the building industry that founded the USGBC-those who
self-identify as "green." We cannot know whether these individuals truly wanted only the
environmental benefits of a greener building industry, whether they saw a commercial advantage in
being at the leading edge of this emerging green commo dity, or whether they were just feigning an
interest. Regardless, as will be discussed further below, these members of the building industry
were still, on some level, motivated by private interest and bottom-line costs.
GREEN BUILDING CoUNCIL, BYlAWS 4
(2008),
available
at
64. U.S.
http://www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=l7 32.
Membership in the Council is balanced through organizational representation
by the following [twelve] membership groups ('Membership Groups' ): 1)
Building
Product
Manufacturers
(including
Building
Controls
Manufacturers/Building Operations and Maintenance); 2) Contractors and
Builders; 3) Corporate and Retail; 4) Educational and Research Institutions (both
public and private including K-12, colleges and universities); 5) Environmental
and Non-profit Organizations; 6) Federal Government; 7) Finance and Insmance
Community (institutions, appraisers, accountants); 8) Professional Firms
(including, but not limited to architectural, engineering, consultants, legal, design
and technical); 9) Professional Societies and Trade Associations; 10) Real Estate
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65

party certification program created and administered by the USG BC. A
developer seeking LEED certification must pay the USGBC to register and
certify its project and incorporate a number of checklist-based green
66
elements into the building's design and construction.
B. The Development and Promulgation of LEED Standards by the
USGBC

To understand how the USGBC develops and adopts LEED standards,
it is first important to understand the basic structure ofthe organization and
the characteristics of those within it who create and implement the
standards. 67 At the top of the LEED hierarchy, and working in conjunction
with USGBC Staff and its Board of Directors (Board), is the LEED
Steering Committee. 68 For issues that require technical expertise, the
Steering Committee relies on USGBC' s Technical Advisory Groups
(TAGs)- the experts who are tasked with "maintaining consistency and
technical rigor" as standards are revised and developed. 69
and Real Estate Service Providers (including building owners, developers,
property managers); 11) State and Local Governments; 12) Utilities, ESCOs and
Energy Service Providers.
!d. The organization has also grown; it now has more than seventy-five chapters throughout the
United States. U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, ABOUT USGBC 4 (2008), available at
http: //www. usgbc. org/ShowFile. aspx?DocumentiD=4896.
65. LEED PoLICY MANUAL 5~6 (2008) available at http :1/www. usgbc. org/showfile. aspx?Doc
umentiD=2039 [hereinafter LEED POLICY MANUAL].
66. See
LEED
Project
Registration
and
Certification
Fees,
http: //www.gbci.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=l27 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The USGBC
administers the LEED program with the help of LEED Accredited Professionals, or LEED APs,
who are primarily building industry players (architects, project managers, contractors, engineers,
etc.) who have taken the LEED AP Exam. See Green Building Certification Institute List of LEED
APs by Area of Practice, http ://gbci.cyzap.neUgbcicertonline/onlinedirectory/ (last visited Jan. 24,
2010). However, in fact, anyone can be a LEED AP if she has taken and passed the test; there are
no other prerequisites. See LEED AP, http: // www. gbci. org/displaypage. aspx?CM SpageiD=84 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2009).
67. The following paragraphs do not fully describe all USGBC or LEED-related co=ittees,
but rather those that contribute to the standard-making process. USGBC members are typically
businesses, corporations, or other entities that are involved in the building industry in some way and
have a commitment to using green building practices. For example, a quick member search on the
USGBC' s web site reveals various local government units, individual contracting firms, and
educational institutes (ranging from local public school systems to large universities) that are
members of the USGBC in the United States. See USGBC: Member Directory,
http://www. usgbc. org/myUSGBC/Members/MembersDirectory.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2009)
(search by Membership Category and Country).
68. The Steering Committee establishes and enforces LEED direction and policy, and
generally oversees all LEED committee activities. LEED POUCY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 11~12.
69. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 12. TAGs respond to relevant credit rulings
and interpretations. Id.
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Upon development of a new LEED standard, the USGBC creates a
70
corresponding committee. Any USGBC member with an interest in the
71
new standard can be a member of the corresponding committee.
Corresponding committee members are not necessarily experts, but
typically have an interest in the new product, and want to receive updates
72
about its development. The USGBC then recruits members for a core
product development committee; this is the committee that will actually
create the content ofthe new LEED standard?3 Some members of the core
committee are appointed while others are selected through a web-based
4
election of corresponding committee members?
Although the USGBC has a "Balance and Participation" policy, through
which they "strive to involve different types of members in the discussions
75
and consideration of proposed" new standards, they do not require
involvement of all member categories on all committees; rather, a
requirement establishes that a "minimum of [five] member categories"will
6
be represented on each LEED committee? Thus, it is entirely}?ossible that
only building industry insiders could comprise a committee.
In the context of creating a new LEED standard the core committee
78
receives input from the TAGs on creation of criteria. Because TAGs are
technical bodies, all members are appointed, based on their expertise, and
9
there is no requirement that they contain a mix ofmembership categories?
Thus, all members of a TAG could be technical experts from within the
70. LEED Committees, http ://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=l750 (last
visited Jan. 24, 20 10).
7 1. !d.
72. !d. The corresponding committees can be unlimited in size. LEED PouCY MANUAL, supra
note 65, at 14.
73. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAlNI"ENANCE MANUAL 6 (2006), available at
http: //www. usg be. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=2040.
74. !d. A call for nominees for appointment to a new core committee is made to the
corresponding committee members. In the case of vacancies on an existing core committee, the
members of that core committee will select and appoint the new member(s) , with approval from the
LEED management subcommittee and the Board's executive committee. LEED, COMMITTEE
CHARTERS: FoUNDATIONS OF THE LEADERSHIP 1N ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN
ENVIRONMENTAL RATING SYSTEM A TOOL FOR MARKET TRANSRJRMATION 8 (2006), available at
http://www. usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=2041 [hereinafter LEED COMMITTEE
CHARTERS]
75. Cf LEED, COMMITTEE CHARTERS, supra note 74, at 21-22.
76. !d.
77 . For example, the following five member categories might be represented: Building
Product Manufacturers; Contractors and Builders; Corporate and Retail; Professional Firms; and
Real Estate and Real Estate Service Providers. Thus, no members from the government, education,
or environmental categories would be able to contribute. LEED CoMMITTEE CHARTERS, supra note
74 ("The TAGs are exempt from the need to demonstrate balance across member categories because
their role is primarily technical and not market based").
78. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 7 3, at 6.
79. LEED COMMITTEE CHARTERS, supra note 74, at 21-22.
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building industry.
LEED standards are purportedly created through a "consensus-based
decision-making" process, which is described by the USGBC as one that
"encourages members and any interested stakeholder to submit comments
to committees."80 Thus, once a core committee has created a draft ofthe
new LEED standards in conjunction with the TAGs, the LEED Steering
Committee and the USGBC Board must approve the draft for release for
81
public comment. The USGBC posts the proposed standards on its
website, and members ofthe public (USGBC members and non-members)
can make comments within a thirty-day period. 82 The USGBC then collates
all comments received, resRonds to each, and revises the draft standards in
83
response to the comments. A revised draft and summary of comments
and responses is posted online, and an additional fifteen-day comment
period begins. 84 During this second comment period, the public may only
comment on items that were revised based on the prior round of
comments. 85
Certain changes to the LEED standards, including adoption of new
80. INFORMATION: CONSENSUS, USGBC POLICIES & GUIDEI.lNES, available at
http: //www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=3350 (last visited Jan. 24, 20 10). Additionally,
" [ t ]he committee structure, with its balanced representation of stakeholders and conflict of interest
policies, ensures that the development of LEED versions is consensus based and even-handed."
LEED Po LICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 18. More generally, voluntary consensus standards bodies
are defined as ones that have the following attributes:
(i) Openness[;] (ii) Balance of interest[;) (iii) Due process[;] (vi) An appeals
process[;] (v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not
necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to resolve objections
by interested parties, as long as all comments have been fairly considered, each
objector is advised of the disposition of his or her objection(s) and the reasons
why, and the consensus body members are given an opportunity to change their
votes after reviewing the comments.
0FFICEOFMGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OFTIIEPRESIDENT, OMB CIR. No. A-119, FEDERAL
PARTICIPATION IN TIIE DEVELOPMENT AND UsE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES § 4 ( 199 8), available at http :1/standards. gov Istandards_gov/a
119.cfm.
81. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25.
82. Telephone interview with Deon Glaser, USGBC, Manager, LEED Technical
Development (Oct. 10, 2008); see also LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25.
83. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25.The LEED Steering Committee must
approve revisions to the product or item. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. Members of
the Core Committees, which comprise the Steering Committee, or USGBC staff are responsible for
responding to comments from Corresponding members, and should do so within 2-4 weeks of
receiving the comment. LEED P OLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 14.
84. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25.
85. LEED POIJCY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. Most connents are received during the first
comment period. For example, the first comment period for the most recent update to the LEED
standards resulted in 5800 comments. The second round of comments only brought in 900
comments. Interview with Deon Glaser, supra note 82.
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standards, require "balloting," or voting by the membership ofthe USG BC,
to accept or reject the changes. Once the proposed change is ready for
balloting, USGBC members receive an email notification and have thirty
days in which to cast votes (each member organization receives one
vote). 86 At least two-thirds of the votes cast must be affirmative in order
for an action to pass. 87 This process was used to create the version of the
LEED standards that are the focus of the remainder ofthis Article, and that
have been adopted in a number of municwal green building ordinances:
LEED Version 2.2 for New Construction.
C. What is LEED?
The LEED process begins with a checklist. 89 For a building to become a
LEED-certified green building, its developer must obtain a certain number
of "points" by incoq~orating design elements from the checklist into its
development project. 9 For new construction projects, points are awarded
in five categories of human and environmental health. 9 Within each ofthe
five areas, there are a number of "credits. " A given number of points are
available within each credit, and it is entirely up to the developer to
determine which mix of credits (and how many points within each credit)
she wants to achieve so long as those points combine to add up to the
minimum number of points required for certification. 92
The LEED version 2.2 program, which was created through the

°

86. LEED POIJCY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25. Unlike the comment period, which is open
to all interested parties, voting to approve a new standard is limited to USGBC members. LEED
POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25.
87 . A quorum of 10% of USGBC members is required. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note
65, at 25.
88. On April27 , 2009, the USGBC launched a newLEED standard-LEED 2009. USGBC,
FA Q, LEED Version 3, http ://www. usgbc. org/ ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=5733 (last visited Jan.
24, 201 0). The newly-enacted LEED 2009, consisting of updates and revisions to the LEED Rating
System, is combined with a revision of the LEED certification process and enhancements to LEED
Online to constitute LEED Version 3 (LEED v3). USGBC, LEED 2009 VISION & EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, http ://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=4121 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter USGBC, LEED 2009 VISION & EXECUIIVE SUMMARY]. This new LEED sys tem,
however, "is not a 'tear down and rebuild' of the LEED that exists in the market but rather a
reorganization of the existing LEED Rating Systems along with several key advancements." /d.
89. For the LEED checklist for New Construction version 2.2, see LEED FOR NEW
C ONSTRUCTION
V 2.2,
REGISTERED
PROJECT
CHECKllST,
available
at
http: //www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=3998 [hereinafter LEED FOR NEW
CONSTRUCTION V 2. 2, REGISTERED PROJECT CHECKLIST).
90. See id.
91. Those five categories are Sustainable Sites, Water Efficiency, Energy and Atmosphere,
Materials and Resources, and Indoor Environmental Quality. Points may also be awarded for
innovation and design process. See id.
92. Points are totaled to determine what level of LEED certification a project can receive. !d.
For new construction pursuant to LEED version 2.2, the certification levels include Platinum (the
highest, which requires between 52 and 69 points), Gold (39 to 51 points), Silver (33 to 38 points),
and Certified (26 to 32 points). See id.
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USGBC methods described above, provides a mix of prescriptive
standards and ~erformance-based points (though the former is much more
predominant). 3 The Alternative Transportation Credit can be taken as an
example of the credit and point system. Within LEED' s Sustainable Sites
category, up to four points are available under the Alternative
Transportation Credit for the incorporation of certain alternative
94
transportation design measures into a project. One point is available for
"Public Transportation Access," meaning that a project is located within
1/2 mile of an existing (or planned and funded) commuter rail, light rail, or
subway station; or within 114 mile of at least one stop for at least two
95
public or campus bus lines usable by occupants of the building. A second
Alternative Transportation point is available for "Bicycle Storage &
96
Changing Rooms. " A commercial building can achieve this point by
providing secure bicycle racks and/or storage within a certain distance
from a building entrance for at least 5% of all building users and providing
showers and changing facilities for 0.5% of Full-Time Equivalent
97
occupants.
D. LEED Certification

The USGBC' s LEED certification program is quasi-judicial in nature: a
developer seeking certification registers its project with the USGBC,
presents documentation showing incorporation of various checklist
elements, the USGBC makes a determination of compliance with those
elements, 98 and there is an internal appeal process for those unhappy with
93. Prescriptive standards are those that tell a developer what he or she must do and how to
do it. Performance-based standards set an end goal, but leave the method of achieving that goal to
the developer. See OFFICE OFMGMr. & BUDGET, supra note 80, at§ 3.
94. Under the LEED for New Construction version 2.2 LEED Green Building rating system,
these are Credits4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. LEEDFORNEWCONSTRUCTIONV 2.2, REGISTERED PROJECT
CHECKUST, supra note 89.
95. LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION & MAJOR RENOVATIONS, VERSION 2.2 , at 12 ( 2005),
available at http :1lwww. usgbc. org/ ShowFile. aspx?DocumentiD= 1 095 (last visited Jan. 24, 201 0).
This is an example of a prescriptive standard, because the developer is given a clear path to
achieving this point.
96. See id. at 13.
97. See id. This is also a prescriptive standard.
98. The USGBC has implemented new LEED standards, which went online in April 2009.
See LEED PoucY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 25; supra note 88; see also LEED v3 ROlLOUT 1
(2009), available at, https://www. usgbc.org/ ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=51 7 6. One of the major
changes in the new version is that oversight of the certification process, which currently rests with
the USGBC, will move to the Green Building Certification Institute and become compliant with the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). See News Release, USGBC, Certification
Bodies Announced for LEED Green Building Rating System (July 29, 2008), available at
http://www. usgbc. org/Docs/News/CBs%20072908.pdf. Further, certification will actually be
administered by independent, third-party certification bodies including ABS Quality Evaluations
Inc., BSI Management Systems America Inc. , Bureau Veritas North America Inc., DNV
Certification, Intertek, KEMA-Registered Quality Inc., Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance Inc.,
NSF-International Strategic Registrations, SRI Quality System Registrar Inc. and Underwriters
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99

the determination. After registering with the USGBC, a developer must
submit project plans for both the design and construction of the project.
After completion of the design phase of the project, the USGBC reviews
the submittals and marks each checklist credit as either anticipated,
10
101
pending, or denied. Certain credits will also be selected for auditing.
Once the project has been constructed, USGBC will formally rule as to
102
whether each credit has been "achieved" or "denied." The USGBC
makes these determinations based on documentation submitted bl the
10
project manager or LEED Accredited Professional on the project.
The USGBC also has its own form of precedential decisions called
104
Credit Interpretations Requests and Rulings (CIRs). During design or
construction of a project, a developer may be unsure whether a particular
planned strategy will be sufficient to achieve a certain LEED credit. Thus,
the developer may submit a Credit Interpretation Request, which a USGBC
105
Technical Advisory Group will then consider and answer. Interpretations
determine whether a proposed action will satisfy the intent of the LEED
credit requirement at issue, and thus enable the developer to achieve points
106
under that credit.
If after final certification review, a developer believes that it should

°

Laboratories-DQS Inc. See id.; see also GreenerBuildings Staff, USGBC Lists Certification Lineup
for LEED 2009, July 29, 2008, available at http ://www. greener buildings. com/print/17754.
99. See LEED POIJCY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 23-25 (detailing appeals process); see also
Jonathan Riker, The Green Zone, L.A. LAWYER, Jan. 2008, at 33 (describing LEED as "a quasi
legal process that involves the presentation of evidence by applicants, a compliance det=ination,
and an internal appeals process").
100. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 22. The credits-and points under each
credit-will not actually be granted until after the design phase is completed. GREEN BUILDING
CERTIHCATION lNSTilUTE, POLICY MANUAL, http ://www. gbci. org/DisplayPage. aspx?CMSPageiD=
156#Application_Review_Policies (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) [hereinafter GREEN BUILDING
CERTIHCATION lNSTilUTE, POLICY MANUAL].
101. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 22 ("[U]p to six prerequisites and/or credits
shall be selected for audit.").
102. See GREENBUilDINGCERTIFICATIONlNSTI1UTE, POLICY MANUAL, supra note 100. This is
referred to as "Final Certification Review." LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 23.
103. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing LEED APs).
104. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAlNIENANCEMANUAL, supra note 73, at 19.
105. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAlNIENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 19. "The
Credit Interpretation Request (CIR) and ruling process was established for project applicants
seeking technical and administrative guidance on how LEED credits apply to their projects and vice
versa." U.S. GREEN BUilDING COUNCIL, GUIDELINES FOR CIR CUSTOMERS, available at
http://www. usgbc. org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=l51 0 (last visited Jan. 24, 20 10).
106. The USGBC website maintains a database of former CIRs that is organized by credit and
that can be searched to determine if a certain approach has already been questioned and analyzed.
While they may provide guidance and information concerning an approach's applicability, CIRs do
not ensure that points will actually be awarded. See LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND
MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 19.
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have been awarded a credit that the USGBC denied, LEED has a built-in
108
as-of-right appeals process called Appeal Review. If the credit is again
109
denied after the Appeal Review, a "Final Appeal" is available. At the
Final Appeal stage, there is also opportunity for an oral presentation of
110
evidence via teleconference.
The reviewing committee makes a
recommendation to the Management Subcommittee, who then issues a
112
Final Appeal Review determination.lll That decision is final.
E. LEED as it Was Intended: The Normal Operation ofLEED as a

Private Voluntary Market Mechanism
The USGBC created LEED as a voluntary leadership standard. In other
words, it was created as a marketing tool. A developer, interested in
portraying herself and her development project as "green" or
environmentally friendly, registers with the USGBC, pursues the level of
certification that suits her marketing needs and desires, and then represents
herself as the developer of a "LEED Certified Green Building," evidenced
by the LEED plaque that she places in the building's entryway.
Developers pay for the privilege of seeking (and hopefully obtaining)
LEED certification for a number of reasons. The benefits of green
buildings are well-documented and numerous. 113 They include
environmental benefits, such as improved water quality, enhanced water
conservation, better indoor and outdoor air quality, fewer landfilled
107. Because of the way the LEED system is currently structured, one point under a single
credit can be the difference between a project that is Platinum certified (52-69 points) and one that
is Gold certified (39-51 points), Gold and Silver (33-38 points), or Silver and Certified (26-32
points). LEED FOR NEW CONS1RUCTION V 2. 2, REGISTERED PROJECT CHECKllST, supra note 89.
108. See USGBC, Certification, http://www. usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=l497
(last visited Jan. 24, 201 0) [hereinafter USGBC, Certification]. A different review team than that
which certified the project handles the appeal, which must be made within twenty-five days of the
Final Certification Review determination. /d. Interestingly, USGBC staff does not perform credit
review; it hires consultants who perform the actual review and award certification. LEED PoLICY
MANUAL, supra note 65, at 23. "USGBC staff will assign the appeal review to one of the
consultants under contract to perform LEED certification reviews (appeal reviews will always be
handled by a consultant different than the consultant who conducted initial review)." !d.
109. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 23. The Management Subcommittee of the
LEED Steering Committee assigns a review of the appeal to "the relevant Technical Advisory
Group, the relevant Product Committee or to the Technical and Scientific Advisory Committee"
depending on the issue that is being appealed. /d. at 23-24.
110. !d. This is the only time that the developer may verbally discuss its appeal in a formal
setting; all other communications are made through letter or email. !d.
111. Id. at 24.
112. /d.
113. See, e.g., Circo, supra note 11, at 731-32 (citing social, political, environmental, and
business benefits of green buildings); Kingsley, supra note 11, at 536-42 (discussing, briefly, social
benefits of green building and noting that such benefits "are numerous and well established in the
literature").
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materials than traditional construction, conservation of natural resources
and building materials, and a general reduction in the many environmental
114
externalities mentioned in the chart in Part I.B.2. Green buildings also
provide a number of purported economic benefits, especially to the end
user. These include reduced operating costs due to lower bills for heating,
electricity and water; increased emRloyee satisfaction and productivity; and
11
the ability to charge more rent.
Studies also demonstrate that green
buildings result in the improved health and comfort of building
116
occupants. Thus, a developer who "purchases" LEED certification is
able to sell that brand to the building's tenants, purchaser, and financiers.
As a market-force-based product, LEED's checklist system makes
sense. It allows a developer to internalize its cost-benefit analysis;
determine what level of certification it wants to pursue (if it wants to
pursue certification at all); and then decide how, through a combination of
points, it wishes to achieve that certification level. Similarly, the USGBC' s
117
are appropriate and legitimate in the context
administrative processes
for which they were created: LEED as a market-based mechanism.
Specifically, the process provides an opportunity for developers who are
interested in green building, and more pointedly, who are interested in
seeking LEED certification, to join the USGBC and participate in the
standards-creation and adoption process. Thus, they have an incentive to
participate, notice and an awareness of the process, and an opportunity for
voice. Importantly, they also have a complete opportunity for exit if they
disagree with the final form of the standards thatthe USGBC promulgates
because they can choose not to seek LEED certification for their building.
As discussed below, this opportunity for exit is a key distinction that is lost
in the translation of LEED from a private voluntary standard to a public
mandatory one.
F. Making LEED Standards Mandatory

Because buildings contribute so substantially to environmental
problems, including global concerns like climate change and local
concerns like stream and air quality, a number of cities have focused their
attention on regulating building construction and demolition as a way to
improve environmental conditions. In many cities, green building
requirements were originally only imposed on publicly-financed or
municipal buildings. 118 Cities thought that if they were to lead by example
114. See A Sample of Building-Related Environmental Externalities Chart, supra Part II. B. 2.;
see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Why Build Green?, http ://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/pubs/
whybuild.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
115. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 114.
116. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 114.
117. See supra Part II. B.
118. See, e.g. , POR1LAND, OR., REs. No. 35956 (2001) (Jan. 10, 2001) , available at
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and construct financially-feasible, successful, well-occupied green
buildings, private developers might follow suit. In other locales , developers
were given incentives such as fast-tracked permitting if they included green
119
building elements in their project designs. However, many cities have
now decided that affirmative requirements are needed to effect real change
in the building industry, and thus also have extended green building
120
requirements to private developers, for private projects.
Cities have begun to incorporate or refer to the LEED standards in their
municipal codes (such as zoning, planning, or building codes). Some cities
actually require developers to register with the USGBC and achieve a
specific number of checklist points prior to the issuance of a building
121
Other cities only
permit, certificate of occupancy, or other milestone.
122
require proof of certifiability prior to the issuance of a permit. Even in
http: //www. portlandonline. com/auditor/index. cfm?a=543 55&c=34835 (reflecting adoption of
Green Building Policy); PORTIAND, OR., REs. No. 36310 (Apr. 27, 2005), available at
http: //www.portlandonline.com/sharedlcfm/image.cfm?id=204110 (reflecting adoption of updated
Green Building Policy); SEATIIE, WA., REs. No . 30121 (Feb. 22, 2000), available at
http://clerk. ci. seattle. wa. us/~scripts/nph -brs. exe?sl=&s2=&s3=30 121 &s4=&Sect4=AND&l=20&
Sectl=IMAGE&Sect2=THESON&Sect3=PLURON&Sect5=RESNl&Sect6=HITOFF&d=RESN
&p=1 &u=%2F%7Epublic%2Fresn l.htm&r= 1 &f=G (reflecting adoption of Sustainable Building
Policy).
119. SAN FRANCISCO PLANNING DEPARTMENT, Pl..ANNrNG DEPARTMENT APPliCATION
PROCESSING GUIDELINES, DIRECTOR" S BUlLETIN No. 2006-02 (2006), available at
http :1/library. municode. com/index. aspx?clientld= 16754&stateld=20 &stateName=Maryland (stating
that building projects that meet or exceed a LEED Gold Rating are deemed "Type 1" projects,
which have a targeted timeline of initial review within two weeks, versus "Type 4" projects, which
are entitled to no special procedures or timelines and may be considered out of order).
120. See, e.g., ANNAPOUS, MD., MUN. CODE, tit. 17, ch. 17 .14 (2009), available at
http: //municipalcodes.lexisnexis.com/codes/annapolis/ (requiring LEED certification for all
applications for new construction or major modifications to public buildings, single family
dwellings, and certain residential, non-residential, and commercial buildings); CALABASAS, CAL,
MUN. CODE, tit. 17, ch. 17 .34 (2009), available at http ://www.municode.com/resources/gateway. asp
?pid=l6235&sid=5 (adopting LEED v2.0 for "establishment, construction or replacement of
privately-owned and city-owned, non-residential structures over five hundred (500) square feet;"
requiring structures up to five thousand square feet to achieve LEED Certified rating and structures
over five thousand square feet to achieve LEED Silver rating); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL, BUILDING
CODE ch. 13C, § 1303C (2009), available at http ://www.amlegal.com/nxtlg ateway.dll?f=templates
&fn=default.htm&vid=amlegal:sf_building (requiring LEED certification for all residential and
commercial buildings in the City). These ordinances vary in form, but most apply to new
commercial construction over a certain square footage. Some also apply to residential projects.
121. See, e.g., POR1LAND, OR., REs. No. 35956 (2001) (Jan. 10, 2001), available at
http: //www. p ortlandonline. com/shared/cfm/image. cfm ?id=2113 52; POR1LAND, OR. , REs. No. 3 631 0
(Apr. 27, 2005), available at http: //www.portlandonline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=ll2682.
This express delegation, requiring developers not only to comply with the LEED standards but
allowing the USGBC to determine whether the developer has complied with those standards,
appears to be an improper delegation oflegislative authority. It also raises questions as to whether
the USGBC can be considered a state actor. While these are very important questions, they are
beyond the scope of this Article, and will not be discussed further.
122. As will be discussed in more detail later in this Article, municipalities are just beginning
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these cities that only require a developer to demonstrate that its project
could obtain LEED certification, were it to register with the USGBC, a
target compliance level is typically set by the city. For example, the City of
Rohnert Park, California allows new private commercial construction
123
projects over 20,000 square feet to "self-certify, " but requires that they
demonstrate to a city building official that the~ have achieved enough
14
points to reach LEED Silver level certification.
G. Why the Current Trend Makes Some Sense: The Benefits of Using
an Existing Private Framework Instead of Creating a New One
From an economic and resource preservation perspective, it is easy to
understand why municipalities are beginning to require private developers
to comply with the existing LEED framework, as opposed to creating their
own municipal green building standards or even incorporating the text of
the LEED standards into their own codes. 125
Private standards are often used to develop public regulations. 126 For
example, the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
(NTTAA) requires federal agencies to adopt existing private sector
to require (as opposed to encourage or reward) private developers to build green. Of those who have
taken this step , almost all require compliance with the LEED standards. See BoSTON, MA.. ZoNING
CODE art. 37 (2009), available at http: //www.bostonredevelopmentauthority.org/zoning/downlo
adZone.asp; D.C. MUN. REGs. tit 6, § 6-1451.01 (2009), available at http ://govemment. westlaw.
com/linkedslice/default.asp?SP=DCC-1000. Further, registration with the USGBC and pursuit of
certification is required by some. See PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE tit, 14, § 14.90.050(A)(l)
(2009 ), available at http ://www.municode. com/resources/gateway. asp?pid=l6551 &sid=5; TOWN OF
BABYLON, N.Y.,
CODE ch.
89, art.
VIII, § 89-86 (2009), available at
http://www.ecode360. com/?custld=BA0924. However, most of these fledgling ordinances do not
require the developer to actually obtain certification from the USGBC in order for building permits
to be issued; rather, most provide that the developer must only show that she could achieve a
specific level of certification if the project were to be registered with the USGBC and she pursued
certification. See Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to Foster GreenBuililing,
Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y. U. ENVTL L.J. 1, 10-12 (2008). Others require
certification, but provide that it can be by an "equivalent" third-party certifier approved by the
municipality's building director or other official. One reason for this is that the USGBC does not
formally LEED certify a building until it has been constructed, whereas most green building
ordinances require compliance with the LEED standards prior to the issuance of a building permit.
123. Self-certified means that a project sponsor has "submitted compliance documentation to
the green building compliance official [a city building official] certifying that the project has met
the standards specified in the [LEED] guidelines and has attained the compliance threshold ... set
forth by city council resolution." ROHNERT PARK, CAL. MUN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.50.020 (2009),
available at http://www. municode. com/resources/ gateway. asp?pid= 16586&sid=5.
124. RoHNERT PARK, CAL, Res. 2007-09 (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.ci.rohnert
park. ca.us/Modules/ ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=426 (reflecting adoption of Green Building
standards).
125. Sussman, supra note 122, at 10; Regulatory Scenarios Chart, infra Part V.B.
126. Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-Private Standard Setting, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 498, 520 (Daniel Bodansky,
Jutta Brunnee, Ellen Hey eds. , 2007) ("[G]ovemment agencies have for decades actively supported
the integration of voluntary consensus standards into their [local] policies and activities.").
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consensus standards whenever possible instead of creating in-house, non
127
consensus standards. A memorandum addressing Federal Participation
in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in
128
Conformity Assessment Activities
suggests that existing standards
should be used for a number of reasons, including: (a) to eliminate costs
associated with development of new standards; (b) to encourage standards
that serve national needs; and (c) to work toward harmonization of
standards. However, neither the NTTAA itself nor the memorandum
addresses the deeper issue of whether publicly created standards provide
benefits not present with privately created standards.
A more specific example of private voluntary standards finding their
way into mandates is that of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). ISO itself is a non-governmental organization that
develops standards in a wide range of areas , including product
129
specifications, health and safety, and the environment. Although these
private standards are presumptively voluntary, many countries have
adopted them as national standards, and many ISO standards have become
market requirements. 13 For example, pursuant to a new rule, all steel
containers that arrive in the United States must be sealed so as to comply
with the ISO Publicly Available Specification 17712 (ISO/PAS 17712),
131
Freight Containers-Mechanical Seals standards.
This ISO standard
avoids the need for the government to create its own high-security seal
specifications.
This approach of applying an existing system is tempting for
municipalities considering adoption of a green building ordinance as well.
In many smaller cities or counties, a planning department may comprise
one or two planners and a director of development, but the building
132
department might have a plan checker and a building inspector.
It is
somewhat infeasible to expect these few individuals, who often already

°

127. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-113, §12 ,
110 Stat. 77 5, 782-83 (1996). However, the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
(NTTAA) does not apply to state or local governments. !d.
128. 0FFICEOFMGMT. &BUDGET, supranote80, at§ 1.
129. International Organization for Standardization, About ISO, http ://www.iso.org/iso/about.
htm (last visited Jan. 24, 201 0).
130. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 126, at 511.
131. Container Seals on Maritime Cargo, 7 3 Fed. Reg. 46029 (Aug. 7 , 2008).
132. See, e.g., Peter Barnes, Valley Planners Overworked: Understaffing Results in Longer
10, 2007, available at
Waits for Permits, THE SPOKESMAN-REViEW, Mar.
http://www. spokesmanreview. com/tools/story _pf. asp?ID= 178544 ("Currently, a staff ofjust seven
people is laying out the future of Spokane Valley. Some of the planning work overlaps with the
building department, which employs about 15 people."). However, some commentators have noted
that the failure of a local government to allocate enough resources to handle these inherently local
environmental externalities is a local problem, and relying on a national system is not the solution.
Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 48.
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have very busy schedules and heavy workloads, to become knowledgeable
enough about green building processes such that they could create and
enforce a standard. 133 Even in larger municipalities, expecting a worker to
add an entirely new area of knowledge to her daily tasks is difficult, and
hiring additional employees is often not possible due to budget
134
restrictions. Further, using an established system allows a municipality's
green building program to get up and running sooner than it otherwise
would, especially in the case of LEED, as many developers are already
familiar with the LEED standards. 135
Another benefit of using an existing system such as LEED is that those
136
creating the standards and administering the program are "experts. "
Most city planners and building inspectors lack the expertise and
experience in green building that a LEED-Accredited architect or engineer
sitting on one of the USGBC standards committees has. Therefore, it
makes sense that the standards promulgated by those experts would likely
be more comprehensive and targeted than some created by city staff. 137
Notwithstanding, it is indisputable that some planners and building
inspectors, especially those in larger, progressive cities, have experience
with green building design. For years, some cities have required some sort
of "green" construction as either a condition of project approval or as a
133. "[T]he Board of Supervisors recognizes that the adoption of new standards without
additional education and training for County staff responsible for enforcement of the standards can
diminish compliance and potentially undermine the efficacy of this ordinance."' MARIN Co., CAL,
ORD. No. 3492 (June 3, 2008), available at http :1/www. co. marin. ca.us/depts/B S/Main/BOSagmn/or
dinances/ord-3492.pdf (codified at MARIN Co., CALCODE tit. 19, § 19.04.100 (2009)).The
counterpoint to this argument is, of course, that smaller cities will likely have fewer permit
applicants, and thus the staff might be able to find the time to take on this additional task. Similarly,
a number of cities, big and small, have adopted green building ordinances that place compliance
determination responsibilities on city staff. See, e.g. , AlAMEDA, CAL, MUN. CODE tit 13, § 13-19.4
(2009), available at http ://www.ci.alameda.ca. us/gov /municipal_code.html (requiring designation
of a Green Building Compliance Official charged with "the responsibility to administer and monitor
compliance with the [City's] green building requirements").
134. But see Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE LJ. 389,405
(2003 ) ("Although relying on private actors can save the government money, this choice can also
increase the government's transaction costs when a transaction involves significant opportunistic
behavior, incomplete contracting, and hold-up problems.").
135. "To enable rapid implementation, industry-established means and methods are
employed." MAYOR'S TASK FORCE REPORT, SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 6, at Exec. Summary 1.
136. David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise ofGovernmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 656-57
(1986).
137. Such use of non-governmental experts has been recognized and supported by the Supreme
Court, and thus is not inherently improper. See A. L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 53 7 (1935) (stating Congress may seek private assistance in "matters of a more or less
technical nature"). But see Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in OxFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 704, 720 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee, Ellen Hey eds., 2007) ("Yet
technical expertise is rarely a sufficient basis for environmental decision-making. Most problems
involve issues not simply of fact but also of policy and value.").
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mitigation measure for other environmental impacts.
Thus, it would not
be completely outside the realm of their experience and expertise to have
certain planners and inspectors act as administrators and enforcers of these
programs. Indeed, as noted above, many cities that now require private
compliance with LEED standards do not rely on the USGBC to enforce the
139
program.
Rather, some of these cities have the building inspector, or a
newly designated employee confirm that the attempted LEED checklist
points could likely be obtained if the project were to seek certification from
140
the USGBC.
While the benefits of using an existing system, such as LEED, are
certainly real, they do not outweigh the clear legitimacy-related benefits
that a publicly promulgated system provides, including a democratic,
transparent process that supplies interested parties with notice and an
opportunity for voice and exit. Nor do they outweigh the stronger
environmental benefits that result from a locally, publicly derived set of
141
standards.
IV. REGIME DESIGN GOALS AND POSSIBILITIES: EFFICACY, LEGITIMATE
13 8. See, e.g. , California Environmental Quality Act, CAL PuB. REs. CODE§§ 21000-211 77
(2009 ), available at http://online. sfsu. edu/~mgriffin/CEQA %20CA %20PRC%2021 000-211 7 7. pdf
(requiring public agencies to prepare environmental impact reports (EIRs) for specified projects
indicating whether the project" s environmental impact will be positive or negative and requiring the
agency to attempt to mitigate harmful environmental effects to the extent possible). For an example
of an EIR that incorporates green building-related mitigation measures, see UNIV. OF CAL,
CERTIFICATION OF THE FiNAL EIR, FINDiNGS, AND APPROVAL OF Tiffi UNIVERSITY OF CALIRJRNIA
SANTA
CRUZ
2005
LONG
RANGE
DEVELOPMENT
PLAN,
available
at
http://www. universityofcalifornia. edulregents/regmeet/sept06!102attach8. pdf. Various mitigation
measures can be found in this report, including requiring lighting for new projects to be compliant
with the UC Regents' Green Building Policies and requiring design measure to maximize
infiltration and dissipation of runoff, including permeable pavement and green roofs. See id. at 9.
139. ROHNERT PARK, CAL, MUN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.50.100 (2009), available at
http: Il www. munico de. com/resources/gateway. asp ?pid= 165 86&sid= 5.
140. See, e.g., PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CoDE, tit. 14, § 14.90.060 (2009), available at
http: //www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=l655l&sid= 5.
141. Further, reliance on private standard-setting organizations to promulgate governmental
regulations is generally frowned upon in the literature on the subject. See Michael T. Mishkin &
David I. Adelman, Gas Industry Standards Board: Legal Considerations in the Standard Setting
Process, 15 ENFRGY L.J. 73, 77 (1994) (discussing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
adoption of private standards, and noting that "in the absence of express Congressional
authorization to delegate responsibilities to non-governmental bodies, concerns about abuse of
power arising from an agency's delegation of authority to a private body would seem to make such
delegations susceptible to challenge"); Shapiro, supra note 134, at 406 (" Reliance on private
standard-setting organizations does not appear to be justified for most types of regulatory
standards."). Notably, many cities have adopted building codes that were created by the
International Code Council-a private entity. Those codes are vulnerable to many of the same
objections raised in this Article. However, a salient difference between the status of public
adoption of building codes and ISO standards on one hand, and adoption ofLEED standards on the
other, is that the former happened years ago, and commentators now recognize the problems
resulting from that model of adoption, whereas the adoption of LEED standards is happening in the
present; it is not yet a cemented practice. Thus, cities should learn from the problems and concerns
that have accompanied adoption of other forms of private standards, and perhaps take a different
path forward with respect to creation of green building ordinances.
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PROCESS, AND GREEN BUILDING ORDINANCE SCENARIOS

A. Regime Design

Whenever a new regime or regulatory system is being designed, it is
important to look beyond the status quo and determine how the system can
be best crafted. It is also necessary to consider what the goals of that
regime should be. I propose that there are two primacy considerations or
goals for any ordinance requiring private developers to construct green
buildings. First is the goal of efficacy: ensuring that governments require
environmentally sensitive, sustainable buildings that will effectively reduce
local, negative externalities and combat climate change, so long as those
buildings are cost-effective and feasible from a financial and physical
construction standpoint. The second goal is that of legitimate process:
ensuring processes that meet various criteria of transparency, democracy,
notice, and an opportunity for voice and exit, and that are not dominated or
dictated by the regulated industry. These goals cannot be accomplished via
local adoption of a privately promulgated, nationally uniform, voluntary
standard such as LEED. Rather, achieving these two goals requires
individualized, locally created green building standards that are developed
and enforced by public bodies, taking into account the needs and concerns
142
of their specific localities. A uniform system that is promulgated on a
national level, or one that is promulgated or enforced by a private, building
industry-controlled entity, will not sufficiently achieve either goal.
B. Public Versus Private Regimes: Different Possible Regulatory

Scenarios
Green building regimes can be divided into six basic categories or
scenarios. Under the first scenario, the local government (e.g., the city
attorney or county counsel, in conjunction with the commissioners)
promulgates an ordinance, which is adopted through a public hearing
process. That ordinance is then enforced by the local government's code
143
enforcement division, police force, or similar local department; this is a
"purely governmental" regime.
The second scenario involves wholesale governmental importation into
its local code of standards that have been written by private entities. 144 In
this scenario, local governments review the text of the regulations or

142. Of course, private standards can and should serve to inform locally developed green
building standards.
143. See Shapiro, supra note 134, at 400 (discussing the "traditional model," wherein a federal
agency writes a standard, adopts it via notice and co=entrulemaking, and then enforces it through
adjudication and remedy determination s).
144. See Shapiro, supra note 134, at 400 (referring to this as a form of contractual standard
setting).
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standards that have been promulgated by a private entity and then
reproduce the text of those standards in their code. Under this "wholesale
importation" approach, some local governments might slightly modify the
text of the private standards to suit local needs. The local government itself
then enforces these standards.
Under the third scenario, the government does not actually import the
text of the privately promulgated standards into its code, but rather adopts
an ordinance that references those third-party standards and requires
compliance with them. This "incorporation by reference" regime can take
one of two forms-a Scenario 3a "fixed import" model, where a
government refers to a then-existing set of standards (e. g., applying LEED
version 2.2, "which is in effect on the date of the adoption of this
"), 145 or a scenano
. 3b " mutable Import
.
" mo de 1, w here a
.
ordmance
government references the existing version of the standard and anyJ,uture
46
version that may be passed and adopted by the promulgating entity. The
local government would enforce the Scenario 3 ordinances.
Scenarios four through six mirror scenarios one through three, but a
private entity, instead of the government, makes the determination of
compliance with the standards. Thus, the fourth scenario is that a local
government promulgates its own regulations, but then contracts with a
private entity to enforce them. 147 Under the fifth scenario, the standards are
promulgated by the private entity, are imported into the local government's
code, and are then enforced by the private entity. Similarly, under the sixth
scenario (which also has subparts a and b), compliance is expressly
required by reference to the private standards (fixed or mutable), and the
standards are then enforced by the private entity. 148 Both the fifth and sixth
approaches are pure industry self-regulation, although the fifth scenario,
145. See, e.g., CALABASAS, CAL, MUN. CODE tit. 17, § 17.34.010 (2009), available at
http: //municode. com/resources/gateway. asp?pid= 1623 5&sid=5 ("The Calabasas-LEED system is
the United States Green Building Council's LEED Rating System Version 2.0.").
146. See, e.g., PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE tit. 14, § 14.90.030 (2009), available at
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway. asp?pid=l6551 &sid=5 (" 'LEED' s Green Building
Rating System (Rating System)' means the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green
Building Rating System approved by the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) and as
that Rating System may be amendedfrom time to time by the USGBC.") (emphasis added). This is
an example of a Scenario 3b mutable import ordinance.
147. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 400. For example, a city could create its own green building
code, but feeling that its staff was too small or lacked expertise, could hire a third party certification
organization to determine whether builders were in fact complying with the ordinance. This
scenario is not currently being used in the green building ordinance arena, and thus will not be
discussed further.
148. See, e.g., BoSTON, MA, ZONiNG CODE § 37 -5 (2009), available at
http: //www. bostonredevelopmentauthority. org/zoning/downloadZone. asp
(adopting
LEED
standards, requiring applicants to submit a completed LEED scorecard and "certification from a
LEED Accredited Professional and/or other expert recognized by the Boston Redevelopment
Authority").
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wherein the local government has the option of revising the private
149
standards to suit its local needs, is somewhat less troublesome.

Regulatory Scenarios
Local Government
Promulgates
Standards
Local Government
Compliance
Determination 150

Private Entity
Compliance
Determination

Scenario 1

Scenario 4

Private Entity
Promulgates Standards
Reference to private standards in
Importation Code (Scenario 3)
into Local Code Fixed Import
Mutable Import
(Scenario 2)
(Scenario 3a)
(Scenario 3b)
Reference to private standards in
Importation Code (Scenario 6)
into Local Code Fixed Import
Mutable Import
(Scenario 5)
(Scenario 6a)
(Scenario 6b)

In the privately-applicable green building ordinance sector, Scenarios 2
and 3 are most common and Scenarios 5 and 6 less common. Scenario 1,
however, would be most appropriate from both an efficacy and legitimate
process standpoint. Scenarios 2 and 3 lack the level of legitimacy that
inheres in Scenario 1 ordinances, 151 but these are not so troubling from an
efficacy perspective, so long as the private industry promulgating the
standards is not the same industry that they set out to regulate (e.g.,
buildings and development). 152
The incorporation of private standards into local government codes and
regulations is not entirely new, but it is in this format, where the
promulgating agency is often also tasked with enforcing the code it has
drafted. For example, the town of Babylon, New York, has adopted a
Scenario 6b ordinance. 153 With respect to a compliance determination, the
149. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 400.
150. The enforcement here is referred to as a "compliance determination." As has been
mentioned elsewhere in this article, see supra Part III. D., green building ordinances typically
require developers to submit evidence that they would be eligible for LEED certification were they
to register with the USGBC and seek certification. However, because that determination must be
made in order to issue building permits or certificates of occupancy, it must be made prior to
completion of the project (the USGBC makes its compliance determination after construction of a
project). Therefore, this Article uses the term "compliance determination" instead of enforcement,
because it is merely a determination that a project could, or will, be certified by LEED upon
completion.
151. Legitimate process issues are addressed infra Part VI.
152. While enforcement by the same industry organization that created a standard raises a
number of legal concerns, those will not be addressed in this Article.
153. BABYLON, N.Y., CoDE§ 89-84 (2008), available at http ://www. ecode360.com/?custld=
BA0924 (The Town of Babylon "hereby adopts, in principle, the [USGBC' s] ... Leadership in
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Babylon ordinance requires that a project actually achieve certification
154
from the USGBC.
This is a different scenario than one referring to private codes that will
then be publicly enforced. For example, the City of Pasadena, California,
has adopted a Scenario 3b green building ordinance that requires private
155
developers to comply with LEED standards.
However, that ordinance
tasks Pasadena's plannin9 director (or her designee) with making a
56
compliance determination.
Regardless of the enforcement mechanism
used, jurisdictions with ordinances following Scenarios 3 or 6 will fail to
successfully fulfill the green building regime goal of a legitimate process.
V. EFACACY AND THE CONTENT OF LEED-BASED GREEN BUILDING
ORDINANCES

The first goal of a green building regime is efficacy. When
municipalities determine what type of green building mandate to impose,
they should balance costs. However, they also should ensure that the
resulting green building will include enough authentic green elements so as
to successfully reduce key local environmental externalities caused by
buildings, and in the aggregate, combat global warming. The current trend
of municipalities importing or referring to LEED standards in their codes
as the benchmark for green buildings will not achieve the regime goal of
efficacy.

A. LEED Is a National Approach, But a Local Approach Will More
Successfully Achieve the Goal ofEfficacy
Despite the arguments in favor of a national or international regulatory
scheme for combating climate change generally, there is at least a strong
argument that green building regulations should be promulgated at the
Energy and Environmental Design for New Construction (LEED-NC) Rating System, Version 2.2,
and, further, automatically adopts any future versions promulgated by the USGBC.").
154. !d. § 89-86(C), available at http://www.ecode360.com/?custid=BA0924. However, "a
temporary Certificate of Occupancy may be issued until proof of [LEED] Certification is achieved.
Prior to atemporary Certificate of Occupancy being issued, the applicant shall pay afee to ensure
successful completion of the Certification .... Ifthe developer achieves Certification status, thefee
paid shall be refunded." !d. § 89-87,available at http ://www.brookhaven. org/DesktopModulesiBri
ng2mind/DMX/Download. aspx?Tabid= 134&DMXMobule=1576&Command=Core_Download&
Entryid=987&Portalld=0.
155. PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE§ 14.90.050(A) (2008) ("The city shall adopt by reference
the [USGBC] LEED™ ... Green Building Rating System as the standard for which a project shall
be measured as agreen building.").
156. "The [planning director] shall: A. Verify LEED™ project registration and review the
required LEEDTM checklist and supporting documentation prior to issuance of a grading or
building permit. B. Verify that the building measures and provisions indicated on the project
LEEDTM checklist ... are being implemented at foundation inspection, framing inspection, and
prior to issuance of afinal certificate of occupancy." !d.§ 14.90.060(A)-(B).
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157

locallevel. This approach comports with the general notion that land use
regulation (of which green building regulation is certainly a subset) is an
area of the law that is traditionally reserved to local governments.
Thus far , green building regulations have been at once both national
and local in application. At the most general level, the LEED certification
program promulgated by the USGBC is a national-level program: the
158
standards are issued by a single entity located in Washington, D.C. ; there
is a sin~,le system of credits that applies regardless of a project's
59
location; and the LEED-Accredited Professionals who administer much
160
of the program take a single, national accreditation examination. On the
other hand, adoption of LEED standards and their imposition on private
161
developers have taken place at a wholly local level.
A regionally focused set of green building standards, however, will
more successfully address local environmental concerns than would a
162
nationally created set of standards such as LEED. Throughout history,
157. See supra Part II.B.2.
158. See U.S. Green Building Council, About USGBC, http ://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.
aspx?CMSPageiD=l24 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
159. LEED does provide different slightly different credit rating systems based on the type of
project at issue and the type of LEED certification that is sought (e. g., new construction versus
neighborhood development versus schools).
160. See Green Building Certification Institute, About GBCI, http ://www.gbci.org /Display
Page.aspx?CMSPageiD=l9 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
161. See USGBC, LEED, LEED Rating Systems http ://www.usgbc. org/DisplayPage.aspx?C
MSPageiD=222 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). Certain federal agencies have adopted LEED
requirements for their own construction projects, including the Departments of Defense,
Agriculture, Energy, and State. !d. All new construction projects overseen by the U.S. General
Services Administration, which manages a number of federal buildings, must be LEED certified.
U.S.
General
Services
Administration,
Sustainable
Design
Program,
http: //www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentld=8154&contentType=GSA_OVERV
lEW (last visited Jan. 24, 20 10). Similarly, a number of states and local governments require that all
new government buildings obtain LEED certification. Buildings, America's Cities 'Leed' the Way,
May 2005 , http ://www. buildings. com/ ArticleDetails/tabid/33 211ArticleiD/247 5/Default. aspx (last
visited Jan. 24, 2010). However, no state or federal agency as of yet requires private compliance
with LEED standards-only local governments have taken this step.
In July 2008, the California Building Standards Connission, which oversees adoption and
implementation of building codes in California, adopted the California Green Building Standards
Code. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 24., pt. 11 (2008) , available at http: //www. documents. dgs. ca.gov/
bsc/2009/partll_2008_calgreen_code.pdf. The standards apply to commercial and residential
construction in both the public and private sectors. Id. § 1 01.3. Although currently voluntary, some
elements of the Code are expected to become mandatory in 2010. See Michelle L. Moore, et al.,
California Green Building Code Update: Coming to a Location Near You, l.EGALUPDATES & NEWS
(Morrison Foerster, LLP), Aug., 2009, at 1-2, available at http ://www.mofo.com/news/updates/
files/15827.html (last visited Jan. 24, 201 0). Of note, the Code does not mention or rely on LEED
standards, but instead creates its own green building requirements and checklist. See CAL CODE
REGS. tit. 24., pt. 11.
162. Further, as some commentators have noted, individual actors' efforts to decrease
greenhouse gas emissions are not presumptively irrational. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 207
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citizens have often relied on local governments to take action before the
163
federal government has done so, and green building ordinances are no
exception; local governments, in the face of inaction and lack ofconsensus
by the federal government, are the ones that are actually making strides in
the effort to reduce both local environmental externalities and the impacts
164
of global warming.
1. LEED Points Are Not Regionally Weighted
A primary reason that a local approach to green building makes more
sense than a national or international one is that flexibility in the
application of regulations is important for efficaciously addressing regional
environmental concerns and differences. Unlike federal or even state-level
law, local governments need room for variation based on their unique
localities and externalities. 165 However, local governments cannot maintain
this flexibility while using the rigid and inflexible LEED standards, 166
which impose LEED's "checklist" format and its "one-size-fits all"
solution. 161
LEED' s failure to account for regional differences embodies this rigid,
one-size-fits all approach. For example, water protection measures that are
implemented on a project in an area like Seattle, Washington, which has a
wet climate and abundant rainfall, result in the same number of LEED
09 (pointing to economic studies that indicate that "a significant fraction of the emissions
reductions that are needed to achieve efficient levels should be made unilaterally by countries acting
in their own, rational self-interest").
163. For example, only state and local governments had been involved with organic food
standards prior to the passage of the Organic Foods Production Act in the 1990 Farm Bill. See
generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Agriculture, Organic Farming,
http: //www. epa. gov/oecaagct/torg.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (discussing the history of organic
agricultural production and the development of national standards). Then, in 1992, the United
States Department of Agriculture appointed the National Organic Standards Board and established
the National Organic Program. United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
Service, National Organic Program, http ://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv 1.0/nosb (last visited Jan. 24,
2010).
164. Engel & Saleska, supra note 7 , at 186 ("[S]tate and local governments are taking action
on climate change despite the United States' decision not to participate in an international climate
change agreement establishing fixed emissions reduction targets.").
165. Circo, supra note 11, at 778.
166. See Charles J. Kibert & Kevin Grosskopf, Envisioning Next-Generation Green Buildings,
23 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL L. 145, 150 (2007) (criticizing then-current version of LEED as being
"rigid with respect to points, categories, and ratings and ... is considered a 'one size fits all'
approach to green building assessment"); Judith Lewis, LEEDing the Pack: Why Our Green
Standards Might not be Green Enough, L.A. WEEKLY , Sept. 14, 2006, available at
http://www.laweekly.com/2006-09-14/newslleeding-the-pack/l (citing criticisms regarding the
LEED system, including that the point system "makes some of its criteria meaningless" and "does
not vary by region or climate").
167 . Transcript: Proving a Building 'Green' Can Be Daunting (Nat'l Pub. Radio May 7, 2008),
available at http: Ilwww. npr. org/templates/transcri p t/transcript. php ?storyId=902 5993 5.
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points as those measures implemented on a project in the desert where
water conservation is a much greater need. Similarly, a project that installs
a green roof in an area with heavy rains, polluted rivers and streams caused
168
by stormwater runoff, and heat island effect problems is eligible for the
same LEED points from the green roof as a project in a suburban area with
none of these problems. Additionally, while points are given for using
regional materials, those points are not weighted differently based on a
. ' s 1ac k or abundance o f certam
. matena
. 1s. 169 Th e pomt
. system' s
reg10n
failure to account for regional differences demonstrates the problems with
a national approach to green building and with the current municipal
adoption trend. Iflocal governments were to instead create their own green
building ordinances, or were to use LEED as the basis of a code but modify
it to suit their local needs, they could target regional concerns and make a
greater number of points available for those "green" elements that would
most directly target their local environmental externalities.
2. Modification of LEED for Local Purposes Is Cumbersome
Many ofthe local governments that have adopted private green buildin.fi
ordinances have expressly referenced 170 or incorporated wholesale 1
LEED Version 2.2 into their codes. However, because the USGBC claims
that it "recognizes that LEED needs to be adaptable to meet the different
needs of different markets in different locations," LEED does provide a
mechanism for altering its standards if local governments choose to do
so. 172 Currently, LEED provides for "supplement[ation]" or "adaptation[]"
by local governments implementing LEED. 173
168. All of these problems can be alleviated by the installation of a green roof. Green roofs
cool the surface of a building" s roof, thereby resulting in lower temperatures in and around the
building, thus reducing heat island effect. CYNIHIA ROSENZWEIG, STUART GAffiN, & LILY
PARSHAlL, COLUMBIA UNN. CrR. FORCLIMATESYS. REsFARCH&NASA GODDARD INST. FOR SPACE
STUDIES, GREEN RooFS IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION: REsFARCH REPORT 3
(Rosenzweig, et al. eds., 2006 ). Green roofs also capture rainfall, thereby reducing storm water
runoff. !d. at 3-4.
169. Note LEED Version 3 includes certain revisions that will alleviate some of these
concerns. See USGBC. LEED 2009 VISION & E XECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 88, at 3-4. For
example, the new standards incorporate Regional Priority C redits (RPC), which purportedly
in centivize dev elopers to pursue certain existing credits that focus on "geographically specific
environmental p olicies," though only four bonus points are available for earning RPCs. USGBC,
FAQ, Regional Priority Credits Frequently Asked Questions, http: //www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.as
px?Documenti D=57 32 (last visited Oct. 1, 2009 ). In spite of this change , as will be discussed in
Part V I.A.2 , a number of municipalities have locked in the LEED Version 2.2 checklist approach,
and therefore will not be able to take advantage of this new flexibility without overhauling their
green building ordinances.
170. See supra Part IV. B ( Scenario 3 or 6).
171. See supra Part IV. B (Scenario 2 or 5).
172. LEED Poucy MANUAL, supra note 65, at 20.
173. LEED POUCY MANUAL, supra note 65 , at 20.
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Adapting LEED involves changing the actual LEED standard to
174
Specifically, local
improve the way it works for a certain location.
adaptations can tailor certain LEED prerequisites and credits to regional
goals, policies, or needs; however, all LEED prerequisites must remain
intact for projects that plan to apply for LEED certification from the
17
USGBC.
Although they are permitted, the USGBC severely frowns
upon adaptations and discourages local governments from implementing
176
them.
On the other hand, the USGBC seems to encourage local governments
177
to supplement the LEED standards to meet local needs. A supplement is
a locally created document that sets out requirements that are new or
different from those required by LEED; the stpJplement is separate and
17
apart from the underlying LEED checklist.
These supplements are
preferable to adaptations, according to the USGBC, because LEED and the
local supplement may be independently modified, thus avoiding the need
179
to change the LEED standards themselves. Local governments could
develop a supplement to LEED that modifies point weightings or creates
additional credits, so long as those supplemental provisions are scored by
180
the local government itself.
174. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 13.
175. LEED PRoDUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 13. A gain,
not all municipal ordinances require that the project actually obtains certification from the USGBC.
176. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 15
("USGBC also strongly discourages the Adaptation of any LEED rating systems for local use.");
LEED Poucy MANUAL, supra note 65, at 20 ("[A]daptation of LEED Rating systems for local use
carries significant burdens and responsibilities for the adapting entity. USGBC considers it
preferable and recommended that any adaptation to local conditions is done by means of a
supplement to the basic LEED standard which of itself remains intact."); see also Shapiro, supra
note 134, at 411 ("[T]o the extent that a politically powerful industry supports private standard
setting , the agency may find it politically difficult to engage in extensive rewriting of private
standards, although it has the legal capacity to do so.").
177. According to the USGBC, supplements to LEED "involve changes in point weightings,
additional credits or modifications outside of [LEED' s existing] flexibility mechanisms." LEED
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 13-14. Adaptations to
LEED, on the other hand, "entail making changes to the LEED standard itself to improve the way it
works for the particular location." LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL,
supra note 73 , at 13.
178. See, e.g., 0FFICEOFSUSTAINABIEDEV., CITY OF PORTLAND, LEADERSHIP IN ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTALDESIGN(LEED)GREENBUII1)INGRATINGSYSTIMSUPPLEMENT3(2002),available
at http ://www.portlandonline. com/shared/cfm/image. cfm?id=ll9695 (providing that it was
developed by the city "to identify both local and state codes that go beyond LEED requirements and
additional green building strategies that are regionally significant.").
179. LEED PoLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 20.
180. LEED POLICY MANUAL, supra note 65, at 20.The City of Boston has done something like
this with its private green building ordinance. BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT Aurn., BOSTON ZONING
CODE& ENABLING ACT art. 37 (2007), available at http: //www. bostonredevelopmentauthority. o
rg/pdf/ZoningCode/Article37.pdf. The ordinance has four "Boston Green Building Credits" via
which a project can obtain points that are not included in the LEED checklist, but which Boston

2010]

M UNICIPAL ADOPTION OF PRIVATE GREEN BUILDING STA N DARDS

325

Perhaps because supplements place additional burdens on cities, 181 or
perhaps because most cities are not requiring developers to actually seek
certification from the USGBC, 182 many cities that have imported or
referenced LEED in their private green building ordinances have neither
supplemented nor adapted it.
In sum, LEED is currently a de facto national program, even though
local governments are requiring, and sometimes enforcing, it. Because
LEED is promulgated by a single entity and makes available the exact
same number of LEED points to a project that is located in Tempe,
Arizona, as it does to one located in Portland, Oregon, it contains many of
183
the problems that other national-level programs entail.
To meet the
regime goal of efficacy, which requires addressing locality-specific
problems of public health, welfare, and environmental pollution, green
184
building programs should be designed at a local level.
B. Lost in Translation: Voluntary Leadership Standards Do Not

Translate Well Into Law
185

The USGBC designed LEED to be a voluntary leadership standard.
By their nature, "[v]oluntary programs are non-mandatory codes of
conduct that actors, Earticularly businesses, pledge to apply to their
internal operations. " 1 6 The creation of voluntary standards for industry
self-regulation inherently involves very different elements than does the
creation of a law or statute to be imposed upon that industry by the
government. Further, attempting to require implementation of voluntary
believes are important in order to address its specific local environmental concerns. See id. § 3 7-4.
181. LEED PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL, supra note 7 3, at 13.
182. Rebecca C. Retzlaff, The Use ofLEED in Planning and Development Regulation: An
Exploratory Analysis, 29 J. PLAN. Enuc . & REs. 67, 70 (2009) (noting that only twelve jurisdictions
instituted requirements for certain developers to utilize the LEED assessment system).
183. See supra Part II. B. 1 (discussing how national pro grams may not address local problems);
see also Jonathan H. Adler, Reforming Our Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policy , 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 7 24, 727 (2008) (arguing that national-level policies regarding hazardous waste "impose
extensive federal requirements . . with little regard for local risk preferences, environmental
priorities, or ecological conditions").
184. This approach will also allow for experimentation with different, alternative methods of
regulation. Such experimentation would allow us to determine which methods work well, and which
do not work at all, even tually leading to a better system. If all local governments adopt and
implement LEED-the current trend-we will be deprived of having alternative approaches for
comparison. See Peter H. Aranson, Pollution Control: The Case for Competition, in INSTEAD OF
REGULATION: ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 339, 384 (Robert W. Poole , Jr.
ed. , 1982).
185. See Michael D. Berrisford, In Conversation with Kevin Hydes, in WHo' s GREEN 25, 27
(Ecotone Publishing LLC 2007).
186. Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Do Voluntary Pro grams Matter? An Empirical
Examination of ISO 14001 Adoption and Firms' Environmental Performan ce 1 (Apr. 15 , 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, http: //www.allacademic. com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/3 /
717/p8377 8_index.html) (emphasis added).
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standards is counter-productive because it takes away the element of
choice. The goal of efficacy would be better achieved through the creation
of mandates that were intended as mandates from their inception.
Even where governments do not adopt voluntary standards into law,
commentators have noted, "[v]oluntary environmental regulations make
for challenging analysis, since the regulation and its impact really
represents the outcome of three interdependent theaters of strategic
187
action. " Those three theaters are: (1) potential regulatees have the choice
as to whether they want to join in the agreement; (2) the terms of the
voluntary standards are negotiated by members to the agreement; and (3)
188
those adhering to the standards determine how to proceed. As it was
intended to operate, all three actions ring true for LEED. However, once
governments decide to require compliance with those standards, (1)
regulatees no longer have a choice as to whether they want to join (unless
that choice is scaled back to the choice of whether or not to build a
structure in the municipality); and (2) the LEED standards have already
been set, and in most instances locked into the municipal law, without
necessary participation by the new regulatee (of course, it is possible that
the builder at issue could have been a USGBC member or contributed
comments to the LEED standard adoption process, but this is by no means
certain). As for theater (3), in some instances, private builders who are
required by municipal law to comply with LEED standards still have some
leeway in determining how to proceed. For example, though a local
ordinance might require compliance with LEED standards at the LEED
Certified level, a developer might choose to actually pursue certification
from the USGBC and perhaps at the more stringent Silver or Gold level,
instead of the Certified level.
One interesting issue that surfaces when private, voluntary LEED
standards are non-discerningly translated into mandatory requirements
concerns the timing of certification. When a developer voluntarily seeks
LEED certification pursuant to LEED' s intended operation as a market
based system, the J§roject is not awarded LEED certification until it has
1
been constructed. One reason for this is that until a building is actually
constructed it is impossible to determine whether certain points have been
achieved, as a building's initial plans and its final layout are not always
187. NAT'LCrn.. FORENVTL REs., U.S. ENVTL PRoT.AGFNCY, VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS: FURTIIERING MoRAL SUASION WHIIB PREVENTING MORAL HAZARD ( 2001),
http: II cfpub. epa. gov /ncer_ab stracts/index. cfm/fuseaction/ display. abstractDetail/abstract/
211/rep ort/0.
188. /d.
189. GRFEN BWG. CERTIFICATION lNST., POUCY MANUAL, http://www. gbci.org/DisplayPage. as
px?CMSPageiD=l56#Application_ Review_Policies (noting that applicants must submit an
application for construction review within two years of "substantial project completion"'). While
there are reviews along the way to determine whether credits or points are likely to be achieved,
final determination is made upon completion. !d.
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identical. Further, a few credits require a performance analysis of the
building before the USGBC will conclusively determine that the building
190
has earned those credits.
Thus, official LEED certification from the USGBC might not issue for
months or fears after building construction has begun or even
19
In the context of LEED as a market tool, this is not
completed.
worrisome. A developer only needs to be able to conclusively represent
that her project is LEED Certified when she is ready to "sell" it to a
purchaser or user (be that a tenant, a building manager, or an owner).
Again, by obtaining LEED certification, a developer can represent to others
in the community that her building will provide a healthy, environmentally
friendly, "green" place to live or work. This not only raises her standing in
the eyes of environmentally conscious potential purchasers but also those
of the environmentally conscious community members generally.
However, when a city borrows and mandates LEED standards, a timing
issue arises, especially if the cit~ requires private developers to obtain
92
Many ordinances require proof of
certification from the USGBC.
compliance with LEED standards prior to the issuance of a building
permit, which is of course required prior to the start of construction. Thus,
compliance with LEED has been transformed from an after-the-fact
marketing tool to a before-the-fact hurdle.
There are additional inherent problems in making a leadership standard
into code. For example, LEED as a voluntary standard will typically make
sense for those who choose to adopt it and implement it in the construction
of a building. However, due to the one-size-fits-all nature ofLEED, it will
not be profitable or feasible for every commercial building over a certain
size to adhere to its standards. For example, LEED awards points based on
a project's location, including points for proximity to transit hubs. This
makes sense for an office building or residential high-rise, but not for an
industrial building that will produce noise and dust-such a building
would be more appropriately located away from a bustling city center.
On this same note, requiring projects to achieve a certain level of

190. See, e.g., LIV HASELBACH, THE ENGINEERING GUIDE TO LEED- NEW C oNSTRUCTION 123
(2008) (discussing "Energy and Atmosphere Prerequisite 1: Fundamental Commissioning of the
Building Energy Systems").
191. Of note, there is currently a large backlog at the USGBC, with more than 10,000
individual projects registered for certification according to its latest count as of June 4, 2008, and
more signing up daily. Andrew Burr, In an Anticipated Debut, Future ofLEED Arrives on 2009
Platform, USGBC IN THE NEWS (CoStar Group, Bethesda, Md.), June 4, 2008,
http: //www. usgbc. org/News/USGBCinTheNewsDetails.aspx?ID=3720. As a testament to the
increased traffic , the USGBC certified the same number of LEED projects in the 2006-2007 span as
it did in its entire six prior years of existence. /d.
192. Most municipalities (at this point) do not require actual certification from the USGBC
prior to the issuance of a building permit or certificate of occupancy.
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193

certification breeds corruption. If a city requires, for example, Silver or
equivalent certification, developers will seek out the cheapest and easiest
points possible, even if those points will not actually result in a more
194
environmentally friendly building. The benefit ofthe voluntary nature of
LEED is that developers can decide for themselves how green they want to
195
go.
This element of choice is lost when the voluntary, market-based
standard is converted into a mandate. This is a problem with the current
trend, which fails to result in an efficacious green building regime.

C. Industry Capture: Self-Regulation and Inherent Bias in a
Privately Promulgated Standards System
Because the USGBC's founders were members of the industry they
sought to regulate, they certainly were not going to impose upon
themselves standards so strict that they could not comfortably be met
(either technologically, or from a financial perspective). Private
organizations have an incentive to-and in fact do-set their own
standards too low to internalize costs. 196 This results in a set of standards
that does not actually re9ulate to a point where it has an effect on the
conduct of the industry. 19 Thus, the standards created by the USGBC are
193. Randy Udall & Auden Schendler, LEED Is Broken; Let's Fix It, GRIST, Oct. 26, 2005,
available at http: //www.igreenbuild.com/cd~l 70 6.aspx. Udall and and Schendler provide an
example of a point mongering situation:
On one project we considered installing a reflective roof. LEED encourages this
because black roofs contribute to the "heat island" effect that raises urban air
conditioning bills. Reflective roofs and parking surfaces address this problem,
saving energy. But at 8,000 feet in the Rockies, heat islands are not an issue. Still,
if we can get the credit, we'd have a better shot at a higher LEED rating, so why
not try? Disingenuous? Absolutely. Fair? Not to anyone, and here" s why. If we
point out that we don't really need the high albedo roof, we'd lose our shot at the
credit, shrinking the pool of possible points we can get. If we go for the credit
knowing it" s irrelevant, we're corrupt. Do you play the game, or not?
!d.

194. This is due to the USGBC' s failure to weight LEED points according to their
environmental benefits.
195. Of course, there is the risk that, as Udall and Schendler mention, any developer who is
seeking LEED certification will want the highest level possible, and thus will be tempted to try to
get all possible points whether relevant or not. This is not inherently tied to the fact that the
standard is required, as opposed to voluntary.
196. Like the LEED standards, the International Organization for Standardization's (ISO)
14000 environmental management standards directly affect a large " set of stakeholders
[who] ... carry the burden of environmental 'externalities' , ... while [the] industry stands to
enhance profits by 'externalizing' environmental impacts." Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note
126, at 522.
197. See Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 126, at 523 ("There is ... an inherent tendency
for private standards to be, overall, less stringent than public ones covering the same subject
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for the most part easy to meet, but not strict enough to solve any real
198
environmental problems. The benefit of easy-to-meet standards is that
developers are more willing to comply with them. While this makes sense
for a voluntary system (which LEED was designed to be), it is not
sufficient for a government mandate that aims to aggressively alleviate
local environmental externalities and combat greenhouse gas emissions
and other negative contributors to climate change.
The USGBC, although itself a non-profit entity, is "subject to the
control of economic actors" (its building industry membership), and thus
"will resolve policy issues in a manner that maximizes ... the profit of
199
those who control it. " Indeed, commentators have noted that even in
non-profit groups, the decision-making process tends to be controlled
200
primarily by industry insiders and representatives.
While early critics alleged that LEED certification cost too much, more
recent data show that basic certification actually adds only a modest
percentage to upfront costs, most of which are recovered in operational
201
costs within one to two years. Further, if one considers the tax incentives
and rebates offered by some localities, combined with the possibility that
the developer might also be the building's long-term operator, even more
202
cost-savings are possible from the construction of a green building. The
matter."').
198. In some instances-especially if a project is to be constructed on an infill site near public
transit-in order to achieve the basic LEED Certified level of certification, a developer will not
need to do much beyond what he or she would typically do for a Class A office building.
Obviously, if Gold or Platinum level certification is sought or required, a developer will have to
incorporate more environmentally-sensitive techniques than he or she might otherwise have done.
199. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 404.
200. Shapiro, supra note 134, at 407 ('"Because [of] the ... industry orientation of most
technical committees, the costs and complexity of increased safety or purity will almost certainly be
weighted more heavily by these committees than by an individual whose primary concern is safety
or health...."'(alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of
Nongovernmental Standards in the Development ofMandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety
or Health, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1329, 1378 (1978)). Here, in addition to the health and safety of
individuals living in and near the buildings, cities are concerned with the health and safety of the
environment.
201. Some critics allege that LEED is an elite standard meant for expensive signature
buildings, and that too few buildings adopt the standard because it is too hard and expensive for
them to attain. See, e.g., GREG KATS, THE COSTS AND FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF GREEN BUILDINGS: A
REPORT TO CALIFORNIA'S SUSTAINABLE BUilDING TASK FORCE 12-18 (2003), http ://www.cap
e.com/ ewebeditpro/items/059F3259.pdf. However, others say basic LEED Certification can be
obtained for as little as 2 to 3% of the total construction costs. !d. (surveying costs in two
municipalities with extensive LEED activities and concluding that the average cost premium for
obtaining LEED certification averaged less than 2% of the total construction costs). Operational
cost recovery is not recognized by many developers and builders who merely construct the building
and then sell it. However, those future operational savings can be built into the sale price of the
structure.
202. Interestingly, some green building materials are cheaper than their non-green
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relative affordability of certification is both a positive and a negative.
On the positive side, and from an economic perspective, developers
constructing large projects should willingly include green features that will
only add 1 to 2% percent to their total construction costs. Because the price
is low, more people would be inclined to add these features to their
projects-this is the beauty of a voluntary certification system with
standards that are within reach. Similarly, developers are more likely to
comply with something that their compatriots constructed than with
something imposed upon them by those outside of or opposed to their
. d ustry. :t03
m
On the other hand, especially ifa municipality requires green features, it
would seem that most large projects could afford to spend a bit more if that
additional capital would enable the building to alleviate even more local
environmental concerns. For example, under LEED Version 2.2, up to ten
204
points are available for optimizing energy performance. Similarll, up to
20
three points are available for providing on-site renewable energy. While
these measures would go a long way toward reducing a building's
contribution to global warming, all thirteen points are rarely garnered due
to cost and to the fact that other, less-costly points are available in other
categories.
The USGBC standard developers recognized that obtaining these points
would result in an environmentally beneficial building, and thus included
206
them as possibilities. However, they also wanted to give themselves the
option of achieving an equal number of less costly points. This is a benefit
of self-regulation.
If non-building-industry-insiders, such as environmental advocates or
clean energy proponents, had created the original version of LEED, it is
possible that the cost of LEED certification would be more, but it would
207
also be more efficacious, resulting in greater environmental benefit. For
counterparts. For example. fly ash. a byproduct of coal-fired power plants, can be mixed with
concrete to increase its strength and durability. Further, fly ash is less costly than cement, which is
typically
used
m
concrete.
Toolbase
Services,
Ay
Ash
Concrete,
http: //www. toolbase. org/T echnology-Inventory/Foundations/fly-ash-concrete (last visited Jan. 24,
2010).
203. A "decision's acceptability is enhanced if those directly affected participate in its
making." Lawrence, supra note 136, at 653.
204. LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION V 2. 2, REGISTERED PROJECT C!IECKUST, supra note 89, at
2.
205. LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION V 2. 2, REGISTERED PROJECT CHECKUST, supra note 89, at
2.
206. Of course, some in the green building industry are acting, at least in part, out of a moral
commitment to efficient buildings and sustainable development principles. See supra notes 63 and
accompanying text (discussing the membership composition of USGBC).
207. In contrast, take the example of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) , which was
founded by the environmental non-governmental organization the World Wildlife Fund. See Errol
Meidinger, The Administrative Law ofGlobal Private -Public Regulation: the Case ofForestry, 17
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example, if a local green building ordinance were to style these important
Energy and Atmosphere Credits as prerequisites to obtaining a LEED
certifiable determination, developers would internalize the costs and build
208
Of course, a city does not want to impose
their projects anyway.
standards so stringent as to be impossible to comply with because that
209
But
would incentivize a developer to build somewhere else entirely.
210
more than a bare minimum should be required.
EUR. J. Im'LL. 47, 51 (2006). The FSC' s program for forest certification imposes standards that go
beyond mere consideration of what would be best for a "profit-maximizing corporation[]," and
includes requirements based upon considerations of human rights and sustainable development,
including requiring "protection of indigenous peoples, workers, communities and the environment"
/d. at 61-62. One can compare these standards to the original Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI)
forest certification standards, which had no requirements pertaining to indigenous peoples, workers,
or communities. /d. at 62. The SFI standards were developed by the American Forest and Paper
Association, which was made up of 200 of the largest companies in the forestry industry. /d. at 54;
see also Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Timber Ad Cut, COMMON DREAMS.ORG, Apr. 3,
2001, http ://www.commondreams.org/viewsO 110403-07.htrn ("Forest Ethics, a Berkeley,
California-based advocacy group that works to protect the ancient rainforests of British Columbia
and endangered forests of North America by redirecting U.S . markets toward ecologically sound
alternatives .
say[s] SFI is a sham, and [is] urging wood buyers to give preference to wood
certified by the Forest Stewardship Council, an independent organization.").
208. We see this in other mandatory land use regulatory contexts. Although there is initial
outcry from developers that they will not be able to afford to comply with the requirements, they
find a way to do so. For example, San Francisco has an Inclusionary Affordable Housing
Ordinance. See S.F. CAL. PLANNING CODE§ 315 (2009). Pursuant to this ordinance, a developer of
certain new market rate housing must make 15% of the total units affordable to families of low
incomes if those affordable units are constructed on-site, as part of the project. !d. § 315.4. If the
developer does not want to include on-site affordable units, he can create an off-site affordable
housing project with 20%ofthe total market rate units, or pay an in-lieu fee. /d.§ 315.5. This is an
extremely costly requirement, but developers in San Francisco have learned to factor it into their
pro formas when evaluating a potential project. The same would be true of costly green building
requirements.
209. See supra Part II. B.3 (discussing race-to-the-bottom theory).
210. A similar problem occurs in the automobile industry. Automobile manufacturers are
capable of making cars with higher fuel efficien cy standards than they currently do-though it
would, of course, cost the automobile manufacturers more money to impose higher standards. See
James Surowiecki, Fuelfor Thought, THE NEW YoRKER, July 23, 2007, at 25 (describing hesitancy
of auto industry to manufacture more fuel-efficient cars, citing "'massive financial and
unemployment problems.'"). Such cars are on the road in other countries. See Roland Jones, U.S.
"Stuck in Reverse" on Fuel Efficiency, MSNBC.coM, Feb. 28, 2007, http: //www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/ 17 344368/ (noting that in 2007, there were only two cars with a fuel efficiency of forty miles per
gallon for sale in the United States, compared to 113 such cars for sale in Europe). However, the
automobile industry has so captured their regulators that the regulators have been hesitant to impose
stricter standards, even though they are possible and could aid in the fight against climate change.
See John M. Broder, Obama Directs Regulators to Tighten Auto Rules, N.Y. TlMES, Jan. 26,2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 1539640 ("The auto companies have lobbied hard against [recent
regulations requiring 40% improvement in gas mileage by 2020] and have challenged them in
court.") In fact, it is only quite recently that President Obama took a step toward reversing this
trend, directing federal regulators to act on an application by several states to set their own
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In some instances, regulatory capture is not an entirely bad thing. For
example, consider building safety and fire standards, which are
promulgated by private organizations. With respect to these standards, an
overly cautious industry has captured the regulatory drafting body:
insurance companies. Because insurance companies do not want to pay out
on claims due to fires caused by faulty wiring or the lack of sufficient
separation between walls, they want to ensure that buildings are going to
be constructed in conformity with highly protective, fire-resistant
211
This is not, however, the case with the building industry.
standards.
While developers want their buildings to be well-constructed to avoid any
claims that might befall them were the building to collapse or otherwise be
unsafe, they also are likely more interested in the bottom line on their pro
formas than the health of local rivers and streams. Thus, where we have
capture by an industry that is not extremely cautious, and direct health and
safety issues (as opposed to indirect ones) are not on the line, it is safe to
say that capture is a negative.
This capture has led to other less-than-ideal LEED structural elements.
For example, just as LEED points are not weighted based on regional
212
they are not weighted according to their environmental
differences,
importance. A system that provides points that cost less but result in the
213
same environmental benefit as more costly points would be welcomed.
However, LEED is not such a system. An extreme example of this is that,
under LEED Version 2.2, one point is available for providing bike racks ,
214
while one point is available for installing an expensive HV AC system.
Similarly, one point is available for using low-emitting paints and coatings
on the interior ofthe building, while one point is available for projects that
treat 50% of their wastewater on-site to tertiary standards (and the treated
emissions limits for automobiles. /d. Although President Obama" s directive does not mandate that
the Environmental Protection Agency must allow the applications, such a result is expected,
possibly bringing much-needed change to this area. /d.
211. There is an argument that capture is not relevant here, as the insurance industry can
regulate privately by setting their premiums, thereby controlling behavior directly.
212. See supra Part V.A.l.
213. If the environmental output were the same, a well-crafted system would encourage
developers to choose the least costly points available; this would be a positive economic decision
for them, and would effectively reduce environmental externalities. A point system has the ability to
internalize not just the cost to the builder (like a tax system), but the entire cost-benefit analysis that
the builder must conduct.
214. LEEDFORNEWCONSIRUCTIONV 2.2, REGISTERED PROJECTCHECKUST, supra note 89, at
1-2 (noting, specifically, Sustainable Sites Credit4.2 and Energy and Atmosphere Credit4). LEED
Version 3 aims to address this complaint through a new credit-weighting paradigm, which
reco gnizes that more points should be available for credits that relate to "more important building
impacts." USGBC, LEED 2009 CREDIT WEIGHTING 1 (2008), available at http: //www.usgbc
While
this
ncc. org/storage/usgbcncc l/documents/leed_2009 _-_ weightings_overview. pdf.
recognition is important, it is presently just a prototype and is expressly not "a wholesale
reinvention of weightings." Jd .
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water must then be infiltrated or used on site)? Such a distribution is
facially inequitable, and such an approach leads to a building that is not
216
holistic. This misallocation of points may be directly attributable to the
fact that the USGBC wanted to create a voluntary system that, if fully
complied with (e.g., LEED Platinum certification), would result in a truly
green building. However, they also wanted to allow developers to do a bare
minimum, by choosing the "easy points, " while still maintaining the
appearance of being green (and being able to market themselves as
217
such).
If, instead of adopting the existing LEED standards as they are, local
governments were to analyze which of the points were most important due
to local environmental conditions and were to modify the standards
themselves, they could combat some of these inherent problems.
Specifically, local governments could pass ordinances fitting Scenario 2 or
3, or even Scenario 5 or 6, using the supplementation or adaptation
processes provided b;:: LEED to make some of the more costly items
218
required prerequisites. Similarly, they could use the same basic LEED
requirements, but adjust the point weightings based on their local
environmental concerns. This would especially make sense in certain
localities that have specific needs (such as requiring water conservation
219
elements in drought-prone areas or requiring white roofs in large cities).
D. Prescriptive Versus Performance-Based Standards: Private

Interests Means that LEED Does Not Go Far Enough
LEED is a predominantly prescriptive system, meaning that it sets forth
the types of materials and methods to be used, but does not require
performance to certain levels, and tends to discourage innovation. In
contrast, a performance-based system sets certain goals to be achieved,
often leaving the methods of reaching those goals to the entity being
215. LEEDFORNEWCONSIRUCTIONV 2.2. REGIS'IERED PROJECTCHECKI.lST, supra note 89, at
1, 3 (noting, specifically, Indoor Environmental Quality Credit 4. 2 and Water Efficiency Credit 2 ).
21 6. Further, the current point system encourages builders to choose the cheapest combination
of points that they can, instead of choosing points that will truly result in an environmentally
beneficial building.
21 7 . Roht-Arriaza & Morrison. supra note 126, at 523 ("The very flexibility that businesses
appreciate reduces the credibility of these standards with local community, NGO, and regulatory
audiences. If enterprises can pick and choose which environmental issues to focus on ... there will
be little assurance that major problems are not being swept under the rug. And if the private
standards are rigorous enough in design and verification mechanisms to avoid this problem, they
will also, by definition , be to o rigorous to entice any but a few leading companies into choosing to
implement them .... ").
218. See supra Part V.A.2 (discussing adaptation and supplementation).
219. See Arthur H. Rosenfeld, Joseph J. Romm, Hashem Akbari , & Alan C. Lloyd, Painting
the Town White-and Green: The Winter Penalty, MIT TECH. R , Feb. 1997 , at 52, available at
http: //www. technologyreview. com/ energy/1 8453/?a=f (noting white , or "cool" roofs, have been
proven to decrease "heat island effect," which is mo st prominent in large cities).
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regulated; the key is the end result. Performance-based systems tend to
encourage innovation, and in the green building context would also allow
greater determination of how "green" these buildings really are. 220 Such
information could then be used to modify future versions of the green
building ordinances.
Because they require testing to verify whether they have been achieved,
goal or performance-based standards are often more difficult and costly to
meet and enforce, as well as riskier, than prescriptive standards. 221 At the
same time, they are also more likely to result in actual environmental
benefits than are prescriptive standards. But due to the cost and risk
involved in performance-based standards, industry-derived standards are
. . 222
more l1"ke 1y to be prescnpt1ve.
The prevalence of prescriptive standards and lack of performance-based
standards result in a set of green building requirements that encourage
people to comply with the status quo. Thus, builders call themselves
"green," when in actuality they are doing little beyond what they might
have otherwise done anyway. For example, an infill developer whose
projects always involve brownfield or greyfield redevelopment within city
limits, close to public transportation and other amenities, will easily
achieve Sustainable Sites credits. In fact, it is likely that developer would
include as project features items re~uired under those credits even if she
was not seeking LEED certification. 23
One benefit of having an ordinance is that those who are subject to it
are required to comply with it. Unlike a voluntary standard or an incentive
based system, cities that adopt mandatory green building ordinances have
decided that people must adjust their construction habits to improve the
planet. Therefore, cities should be willing to impose tough regulations, not
just requirements that give an appearance of being environmentally
220. A performance-based standard could be used to require reduced parking and traffic
generation relative to a baseline. For example, a 20% reduction in vehicle trips relative to the
baseline could result in one point, while a 60% reduction could result in three points. See Todd
Litman, Victoria Transp. Policy lnst., RECOMMENDATIONSFOR IMPROVING LEEDTRANSPORTATION
AND PARKING CREDrrs 11 (2008), available at http: //www.vtpi. org/leed_rec.pdf.
221. It is impossible to determine if a performance-based standard has been met until the
project has been completed, and the item can be measured. Thus, there is a risk in that a developer
will not know if he has met the requirements of such a standard until everything is in place and
completed. This may cause a developer to devalue its building, due to the inability to accurately
assess risks.
222. Standards created by those outside the regulatory industry, though, often contain
performance-based standards. For example, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) forest certification, a
nan-forest-industry-based program created by predominantly environmental interests, incorporates a
number of performance standards, which "require the achievement of concrete conditions in the
forest or in human organizations related to the forest." Meidinger, supra note 207 , at 65.
223. For example, the developer will build close to public transit and neighborhood amenities
and provide on-site open space. Although this developer, with a history of engaging in
environmentally preferable practices, should not be penalized or held to a higher standard than a
suburban-style developer, if a city finds that most of its development is already infill, it should insist
upon a green building ordinance that goes beyond LEED.
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forward. 224 Government-created (e.g., Scenario 1), or at least government
vetted and modified (e.g., Scenarios 2 or 5), green building standards could
go further in requiring a real change in "business as usual" in the building
and construction arena.
VI. LEGITIMATE PROCESS AND THE METHODS BY WHICH LEED
STANDARDS ARE PROMULGATED AND ADOPTED INTO MUNICIPAL LAW
The preceding Part focused on the content of green building
regulations, and argued that the regime goal of efficacy will not be met
through a system that is created on a national level by a private, industry
based organization. This Part addresses the second regime goal- a
legitimate process-in an attempt to demonstrate that this goal will not be
achieved by public adoption of private LEED standards. When a legitimate
process is lacking, as it is here, we must see ifthe existing process provides
adequate "substitutes" for legitimacy-those elements that make a process
legitimate in the first place- such as democracy, transparency, notice, and
an incentive and opportunity for voice and exit. The USGBC's current
promulgation process does not sufficiently address these concerns; thus,
legitimate process can only be achieved through a green building ordinance
that is promulgated locally and publicly.
A. Lost In Translation: The USGBC 's Process Was Not Designed

To Ensure Publicly Legitimate Democracy
There are two levels of process at issue with respect to municipal
adoption of LEED-based green building ordinances. The first is the local
government process by which a municipality adopts an ordinance that uses
the LEED standards as its content. Because this is a governmental process,
it is presumptively legitimate.Z 25 However, it is the content ofthe ordinance
that is key. In many cities' green building ordinances, the content is
determined not through that local process, but through the underlying
USGBC LEED standards-creation and adoption process. 226
Although the USGBC' s administrative processes are adequate with
respect to the purposes for which they were created (LEED as a voluntary,
consensus-based, market-force standard), they do not ensure that the
regime goal oflegitimate process will be met when translated to mandatory
municipal green building ordinances. The processes put in place by the
USGBC to create the LEED standards sufficiently allow potentially
interested players (e.g., those who think they might want to obtain LEED
224. If a city makes a determination that it wants to address its local environmental
externalities, and wants to alleviate larger environmental concerns like climate change, it should be
willing to "put its money where its mouth is." A city that makes this determination, but is not
willing to invest any time or resources in to developing a system that will actually work, is just
furthering the "greenwashing" problem that has plagued so many since "green" became a
commodity.
225. Meidinger, supra note 207, at 81.
226. The details of that process were set forth in Part III. B.
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certification) to gain knowledge of, and take part in, the standards-creation
process. They participate in electing the individuals who will design the
standards, they can voice their opinions about the content of the proposed
standards through the comment process, and perhaps most importantly, if
they do not agree with the final content of the standards, they have the
complete ability to exit by deciding not to seek LEED certification.
A key element of a voluntary system such as LEED is that those who
would be subject to it can decide whether they want to be subject to it.
Transforming voluntary participation into mandatory compliance forces
those who would have opted out not to do so and forces those who were
not involved with the development of the standards to comply with them.
Requiring private developers to comply with voluntary LEED standards is
therefore problematic. Whether those developers did or did not participate
in the LEED standards creation process, they now lack a major element
that made the USGBC' s administrative promulgation process legitimate:
. 227
t he ab1"l"tty to exit.
1. Legitimacy of Private Standards-Making Bodies

If we ignore, for a moment, the fact that the standards promulgated by
the USGBC's processes are being adopted into governmental codes, we
can examine the literature that addresses general rule-making processes for
social and environmental standard-setting organizations-in other words,
the USGBC's administrative processes as they were intended to be used.
While the USGBC aims for a legitimate process, and provides one in the
context of creating a voluntary standard, it does not provide enough
assurance that these standards can be legitimately imported into local codes
and required of private developers.
The International Social and Environmental Accreditation and
Labelling Alliance (ISEAL) is a collaboration of leading international
standard-setting and conformity-assessment organizations focused on
social and environmental issues. 228 In 2006 this group issued a "Code of
Good Practice," which, if followed, would purportedly aid in the
legitimacy of certification-related standards promulgated by non
229
.
. .
governmenta1, standard-settmg orgamzatwns.
227 . They can. of course. exit by deciding not to build in the locality, but that is an exit of a
much greater scale.
228. ISEAL Alliance, About the ISEAL Alliance, http://www.isealalliance.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=Page. viewPage&pageld=47 1.
229. ISEAL, ISEAL CODE OF GooD PRACTICE FOR SETIING SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS 2. (2006), available at http: //www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_uploadlcontent/POOS_
ISEAL_Code_PD4_Jan_06.pdf; see also Meidinger, supra note 207 , at 68-69. The American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) is another organization that approves standards, as well as the
processes used to create them. ANSI, About ANSI Overview, http ://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/over
view/overview.aspx?menuid=l (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). Currently none of the USGBC' s LEED
standards are ANSI approved; however, the USGBC itself is an ANSI standards developing
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ISEAL suggests that organizations take certain steps to ensure the
promulgation of standards in a legitimate and transparent way, including:
(1) following documented procedures, including a complaints resolution
mechanism; (2) giving interested parties an opportunity to comment about
whether the standards are needed when a new standard is being developed;
(3) allowing two rounds of comment submissions by interested parties
during public review with a minimum sixty-day comment period; (4)
compiling comments and preparing responses to those comments,
indicating how the issues have been addressed in the standards; (5) striving
for a consensus among a balance of interested parties; (6) promptly
publishing approved standards; and (7) maintaining records of standards
. . . 230
d eve1opment activities.
ISEAL recommends providing commenting power to all "interested
parties," which it defines as "[aJni' person or group concerned with or
3
directly affected by a standard." This implies that those who are not
members of the organization but who might be affected by a standard
232
In the LEED context, this would
should be permitted to comment.
clearly include developers who might eventually be required, via a local
ordinance, to comply with the LEED standards, as well as local residents
who are impacted by environmental externalities of buildings. USGBC's
notice and comment process may appear to be generally consistent with
ISEAL' s recommendations. Although notice of revisions to standards is
only directly given to USGBC members, both members and nonmembers
may comment on proposed standards. Notwithstanding, only members can
vote to approve the standards, and there is no true incentive for most
individuals who are not in the development industry to participate in the
promulgation ofLEED standards, not knowing that compliance with those
standards may eventually be required of developers in their towns.
ISEAL also suggests that "participation reflects a balance of interests
among interested parties in the subject matter and in the geographic scope
to which the standard applies" and that "[s]tandard-setting organizations
shall include a balance of interests in the structures that are responsible for
233
developing and approving social and environmental standards. " While
we have information about how membership on USGBC's standards
creation committees is determined, we have no assurance that all sectors of
membership will be equally represented on those committees, nor that they
234
will not be dominated by building industry interests.
organization. Interview with Deon Glaser, supra note 82.
230. ISEAL. supra note 229. at 4--5; see also Meidinger, supra note 207, at 68.
231. I SEAL, supra note 229, at 3.
232. See Meidinger, supra note 207 , at 7 0 ("The underlying idea is that a standard will be
good, and presumably legitimate, if it reflects the priorities of interested parties.").
233. ISEAL, supra note 229, at 6.
234. See supra notes 64--66 and accompanying text.

338

FWRIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 62

Further, although these committees can, and possibly do, have varied
representation from within the USGBC' s membership ranks, they are made
235
up of private individuals. Though membership is in theory open to all,
not just "anyone" can in fact be an active organization member. First,
members must be able to pay a fee to join the organization. Further-and
this is especially true of committee members who are very involved with
the process of developing new standards-they must be able to afford to
donate their time to attend meetings. Moreover, while some committee
members are elected by a portion of the USGBC membership, some are
appointed, either by existing committee members or by USGBC' supper
level executive Board and Steering Committees. Despite these concerns,
the USGBC' s internal methods appear to be generally consistent with the
ISEAL principles, and thus likely impart legitimacy to their voluntary
consensus standards-development process. In spite of the process used to
create standards, even the USGBC recognizes that if it can get the
standards themselves accredited by a third-party accreditation program
such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), it will go a long
way towards making it easier for governments to adopt those standards and
feel more comfortable with the level oflegitimacy and public participation
that goes into the adoption process. However, even if they are legitimate
for the purposes for which they were created, the USGBC' s administrative
process does not conclusively impart sufficient legitimacy to the LEED
236
promulgation process for those standards to be imported into public law.
B. Ensuring Legitimate Process Through Substitutes for Legitimacy

1. Legitimacy
At its base, a regulatory system is legitimate if it can "be traced to a
properly functioning organ of a state; states themselves [are] presumptively
235. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, I would also point out that private actors,
such as the USGBC committee members, are not state actors, and thus need not obey the same types
of norms. See Shapiro, supra note 134, at 419 ("[P]rivate actors are not constrained in the same
manner as government actors to obey such important norms as fairness, nonarbitrariness, and
nondiscrimination."); see also Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1229, 1246 (2003 ) (noting that ceding control to private entities
"creates possibilities of weakening or avoiding public norms that attach, in the legal sense, to 'state
action' or conduct by government").
236. The USGBC system is not inherently democratic, in that each member organization gets a
single vote. See Bodansky, supra note 137, at 7 15. This means that an organization with 500
members has the same control and weight as an organization with five members. See id. ("There is
nothing obviously democratic about a system that gives 10,000 inhabitants of a small-island state
the same weight as one billion inhabitants of China or India."). Similarly, public participation,
while encouraging transparent processes, does not necessarily result in a legitimate process,
especially when the participating "public" is in fact merely groups, each of which is given one vote,
purporting to represent their members. Finally, while expert opinions are often entitled to deference,
their decisions are not intrinsically correct, nor will they necessarily produce the best outcomes.
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237

legitimate. " When legitimacy cannot be traced back to public lawmaking
procedures, commentators have posited certain alternative bases of
legitimacy. These include expertise, transparency, notice, and opportunity
238
Although it is presumed that a typical municipal
for voice and exit.
ordinance adoption process is legitimate, in the context of adoption of
LEED standards, the content of the ordinance at issue have not been
promulgated by the governmental body; rather, they have been created by a
239
Therefore, because the USGBC' s administrative
non-state body.
processes cannot be traced to a governmental process, we must consider
f or 1egttlmacy.
..
240
.
t he su bstltutes
2. Local Processes Are More Legitimate Than National Processes
Notice, Incentive, and Voice
In addition to producing a system that is more certain to address local
externalities, a locally-created green building regulatory scheme is more
likely to allow for citizen participation than a nationally promulgated
scheme. At the most basic level, this is because citizens are often provided
with greater notice of local actions, 241 and have a greater incentive and
opportunity to voice their opinions at city council and planning

237 . Meidinger, supra note 207, at 81. Of course, if one believes in public choice theory, then
this is not necessarily true, because governmental decisions may simply reflect the private, special
interests that dominate the local political process. Indeed, my proposal may only guarantee a
formally legitimate process. However, a public, governmental process at least provides for the
possibility that special interests other than builders will organize to make their voices heard. For
example, because the USGBC is dominated by building industry interests, it is unlikely that
organized environmentalists have substantial input in the LEED promulgation process. In contrast,
a public process gives those environmentalists an opportunity to counter the builders in a public
hearing, and perhaps gain the ear of their local elected officials.
238. Bodansky, supra note 13 7 , at 7 15.
239. There is no evidence that the LEED standards have been thoroughly reviewed and vetted
just because they have been incorporated by reference into a local government's code through a
public lawmaking process. Indeed, city staff typically proposes the text of an ordinance for
adoption, and city governmental entity will vote that ordinance up or down. This is especially
concerning in a Scenario 3 or 6 jurisdiction.
240. One may query whether legitimacy is even important in this scenario. Typically,
legitimacy is important to those who are being regulated; they will be more likely to comply with
laws that they believe to have been reached through a legitimate process. See,e.g., Richard Parker,
The Use and Abuse ofTrade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn From
the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENV1L L. REv. 1, 75 (1999). Here, however, building
industry insiders should feel more comfortable complying with standards created by their brethren
(whether or not those processes were inherently legitimate) than with regulations created and
enforced solely by a government entity, albeit a legitimate one.
241. For example, many zoning and planning codes require notice of public hearings that will
affect a particular parcel of land to be mailed to that parcel's owner. The same canno t be said of
national-level environmental rulemaking activities.
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commission hearings or local meetings of private organizations, than they
242
would at a national-level hearing or organizational meeting.
On the public front, the adoption of a municipal law typically follows a
predictable, legitimate public process. First, city staff develops and
recommends a municipal law for adoption. The city then holds a publicly
noticed hearing where citizens are given an opportunity to comment on the
merits of the proposal. Before the proposed law can become part of a city's
code, the local elected governing body, such as a Board of Supervisors or
Commissioners, as well as the Mayor, must vote to approve it (as an
ordinance or resolution). Those officials often consider public comments
and make proposed changes to staffs suggested law in response to the
comments. The creation and approval of a green building ordinance that
was proposed in a Scenario 1 jurisdiction, which provides legitimate
process, would follow this typical structure.
If a municipality were to use LEED as the base of its local ordinance
and then add its own localized modifications (Scenario 2), members ofthe
public who may be impacted by those standards- not only developers, but
also community members and environmentalists-would still have an
opportunity to comment on the contents of the ordinance, and thus have a
243
Therefore, this locally-adopted Scenario 2
voice in the final product.
244
method also affords legitimate process.
Thus, in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 jurisdictions, citizens have an
opportunity to affect the content ofthe green building ordinance standards.
Such voice imparts legitimacy to the process. Further, if residents disagree
with policies or laws that are passed and approved by the city's
government, they have an additional opportunity for voice and exit: they

242. It is also typically easier to reach a decision or get ordinances passed at local, rather than
national levels, because less consensus is required. Compare, e.g., BoARD OF SUPERVISORS, CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, RUlES OF ORDER§ 2.16 (2007), ("(T]he favorable vote of six of
the eleven Supervisors is required to approve ordinances .... Ordinances require consideration at
two separate meetings with at least five days intervening, a first reading and a final passage."),
available at http: //www. sfbos. org/Modules/ShowDocument aspx?documentid=34253 with ROBERT
B. Do vE, ENACIMENTOFALAW, http: //thomas.loc.gov/home/enactment/enactlaw.pdf (last visited
Jan. 24, 2010) (briefly, bills in United States Congress originate in one chamber, are referred to
committee and subject to amendment and change, then put to vote before the entire chamber and
subject to amendment once again, and upon favorable passage are sent to the other chamber where
the pro cess repeats itself). See also Schoolhouse Rock, I'm Just a Bill,
http: //www. schoolhouserock. tv/Bill.html (last visited Jan. 24, 201 0) (describing legislative process
from perspective of cartoon "Bill").
243. Indeed, local decision-makers have more of an incentive to listen to their constituents
than do national governments or agencies, because those constituencies are smaller and more able
to act out against decisions with which they disagree.
244. The same legitimate process would be present in the promulgation and adoption of a
Scenario 5 ordinance. However, because it would be enforced by the promulgating entity, it would
lose some element of legitimacy.
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may vote the officials who passed the ordinance out of office. Ifthey are
unsuccessful in doing so, there remains an extreme form of exit, in that
they can move to a different jurisdiction with policies more suited to
246
them.
In contrast, if the government is contemplating a Scenario 3 or Scenario
6 type of ordinance and will merely reference the LEED standards in its
code without any changes or modifications, members of the local
community will not have the opportunity to affect the content of the
ordinance itself; the USGBC has already set the terms of LEED at a
national level. Citizens will be able to speak at the public hearing on
adoption of the ordinance itself, but they will only be able to offer "up or
down" input, either asking the locality to approve the ordinance, with
LEED as it is, or reject the ordinance outright. Although technically,
individuals could have commented on the LEED standards via the
USGBC's comment process, this is unrealistic. Average citizens and
developers with no interest in green building likely had no notice of the
LEED standards adoption process, and moreover had no incentive to voice
their opinions about, for example, the promulgation of LEED Version 2.2,
because at the time that it was published for comments, their cities had not
yet considered adopting it.
Further, in a Scenario 3 or Scenario 6 jurisdiction, even if local
residents complain to their elected officials that they disagree with certain
elements of the LEED requirements, those city officials are powerless to
247
change the underlying LEED standards. Indeed, the average citizen
especially one who is not a member of the USGBC-cannot avail herself
of a democratic process to vote out the USGBC committee members if she
248
This lack of voice is
disagrees with new LEED requirements.
particularly problematic in this context when there is no real possibility of
exit. Therefore, Scenario 3 and Scenario 6 ordinances, which rely on
national promulgation of the LEED standard by the USGBC, fail to
achieve the regime goal of legitimate process. In contrast, Scenario 1 and
Scenario 2 ordinances, which rely on a local process, meet that goal.
To summarize, depending on the ordinance scenario utilized, different
245. Local governments also must provide notice of all public meetings. and many actually
mail notices about meetings to property owners whose property will be directly impacted by a
matter to be addressed at a given meeting. In contrast. though the U SGBC posts notice of its
proposed new standards on its website for public comment, an average citizen would have no
knowledge of the USGBC comment process, nor reason to look into it.
246. This drastic form of exit would also be present if a city adopted the LEED standards,
unless LEED s tandards are adopted universally.
247 . Of course, the city officials can always pass a new ordinance that does not expressly rely
on LEED. My point here is that they will not be able to reach into the USGBC' s process and alter
the terms of the LEED standards themselves.
248. Even LEED members lack a voice in attempting to remove the appointed USGBC
committee members.
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levels of legitimate process are present. A Scenario 1 jurisdiction, where
the local government promulgates and enforces the standards it imposes on
private developers, is the most protective of democracy and the rights of
local citizens. Such a jurisdiction would not have any of the legitimacy
problems addressed in this Part. Similarly, green building ordinances in a
Scenario 2 or Scenario 5 jurisdiction allow for more process than do those
in a Scenario 3 or Scenario 6locale. The reason for this is that in Scenarios
2 and 5, the local government actually had to review the details of the
LEED standards, determine that they were suitable for the city (perhaps
even modifying them slightly, allowing citizens to affect their content), and
then adopt them through the normal public lawmaking process, affording
opportunity for public comment at a public hearing. Although members of
the community might not agree with the content of the green building
ordinance, they could not deny the ordinance's legitimacy, because it was
249
"duly enacted by a democratically elected legislature. "
Finally, a
Scenario 3 or Scenario 6 jurisdiction, especially one with a 3b or 6b
mutable import ordinance, is the least protective oflegitimate ~rocess and
50
provides for the least amount of notice, incentive, and voice. In these
ordinances, no evidence exists that the local governments actually worked
through the details of the standards, deciding instead to just refer to them in
their codes. This is pure delegation of standard-making authority to the
251
private promulgating entity and imparts no legitimacy to the process.
Encouraging local governments to design their own green building
regimes, which take into account their own localities' concerns and desires,
will help to achieve the regime goal of legitimate process, resulting in
greater public notice, incentive to participate, and voice.
3. Public Processes Are More Legitimate than Private Processes
a. Transparency
While the USG BC has attempted to make the LEED processes for
promulgating standards somewhat open, there are no requirements that it
do so. On the other hand, public agencies and state actors 252 are subject to
249. Bodansky, supra note 13 7 , at 7 08 (emphasis added).
250. Certainly, Scenarios 1 through 3 are more protective of democracy than are Scenarios 5
and 6, which do n o t even require public compliance determinations.
251. Indeed, Scenarios 3b and 6b are less legitimate, and afford less participation, than 3a or
6a, because in the mutable reference scenarios, rulemaking authority has been completely delegated
to the private entity; they city need not necessarily even be aware when a new version of the LEED
standard is approved and operational.
252. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the issue of whether the USGBC would be
considered a state actor. However, an initial review of the literature suggests that, because there is
limited to no government involvement in the USGBC" s actual development of standards and
awarding of certification, it would not be considered a state actor. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The
Contracting State, 28 FlA. ST. U. L. REv. 155, 158 (2000) ("[Regulatory contracts] depend heavily
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open government and records requirements, such as the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and local "sunshine ordinances." These rules
require the production, upon request, of documents revealing public
253
decision-making processes. One commentator even refers to FOIA as a
254
These
"formalization of the tradition of transparency in government."
ordinances do not apply to private, non-state actors, and yet, with respect to
LEED and the USGBC, the standards promulgated by those actors have
255
become law.
Scenario 1 ordinances would most effectively address these concerns,
and even a Scenario 2 jurisdiction would be acceptable because the public
process would inherently include an open discussion and possibility for
modification of the content of the privately promulgated standards, thus
. transparency to the process. 256
1en dmg
b. Notice, Incentive, and Opportunity for Voice
For many of the same reasons that standards promulgated locally,
instead of nationally, provide opportunities for notice, incentive, and
voice, 257 standards promulgated by public entities, more so than those
promulgated by private entities, provide these same benefits. The public
records acts, addressed above, provide those who may be affected by
publicly developed ordinances with an opportunity to gain knowledge
about the processes used to promulgate the regulations, and the
requirement that public entities make decisions as part of an open public
lawmaking process allows the opportunity for voice. Again, a Scenario 1
jurisdiction would allow for both of these benefits to the greatest extent.
Although the processes used to arrive at the text of the LEED standards
within the context of the USGBC process do not sufficiently provide
average citizens with notice, incentive, or voice, a Scenario 2 jurisdiction
that publicly considers the content of those privately-created regulations
prior to their adoption addresses some of these participation concerns.
A salient analogy is that of the ISO 14000 series environmental
on private actors that tend not to be bound by constitutional or administrative law constraints."'
(citations omitted)).
253. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(A); S.F. CAL, SUNSHINE ORDINANCE,
art. III,§ 67 .2l(a) (2008).
254. Brian J. Gorman, Biosecurity arui Secrecy Policy: Problems, Theory, and a Call for
Executive Action, 2 ISJLP 53, 65 (2006).
255. Lawrence, supra note 136, at 654.
256. As an aside, performance-based standards tend to foster a more transparent process than
prescriptive standards, because the goals that are to be achieved via performance standards are
clearly set forth. In contrast, with a prescriptive standard, a developer may be told what material to
use, but not why that material is superior to others, thus obscuring the true intent behind the
standard. See AM. Soc'y OFMECH. ENGRS, PERFoRMANCE BASED CODESAND STANDARDS 1 (2004),
available at http: //cs tools. asme. org/csconnect/pdf/CommitteeFiles/13 525. pdf.
257 . See supra Part VI.B.2.
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management standards, which were developed by a group, like the
258
USGBC, that "remains heavily influenced by the private sector. "
Although that group's scope of work has substantially expanded to
encompass activities that may have significant societal impacts, there has
not been a corresponding increase in the representation of public
stakeholders. This fact has been the source of consternation to some
government agencies and civil society groups who have expressed a
preference for the development of public standards whenever practical and
259
f easi bl e.
C. A Final Process Concern: The Problem ofLEED as a Changing
Standard
The USGBC' s LEED standards are not static. Green building
technology, as with all construction and architectural technology, is
constantly evolving. As new methods of recycling, materials reuse, and
energy conservation are developed, the design of green buildings will also
change. In recognition of this, the USGBC did not create LEED to be a
static system. LEED for New Construction began with Version 1.0, moved
through Versions 2.0, 2.1, and 2.2, and now the next version ofLEED, 3.0,
is online. 260 While the USGBC's recognition of emerging technologies is
important, many cities that have adopted LEED into their Codes have
overlooked, or not yet addressed, this point.
Municipalities appear to be taking two tracks when it comes to deciding
which version of the LEED standards their green building ordinances will
incorporate. Some are locking into place the version in effect when their
green building statute was promulgated (the fixed reference, Scenarios 3a
and 6a), 26 1 while others state that the version ofLEED in effect at the time
of permit application controls (the mutable reference, Scenarios 3b and
6b). 262 For example, the San Francisco green building ordinance (a
258. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 126, at 522.
259. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 126, at 522.
260. See supra notes 88, 98.
261. See, e.g. , S.F., CAL, BUilDING CODE ch. 13C, § 1304C.O (2007 ) ("Thefollowing green
building requirements shall apply to all projects within the scope of this chapter. ... The applicable
LEED® ... performance standards for any applications subject to this legislation, regardless of
application dates, are:
. LEED®-NC v2.2-LEED® for New Construction (July 2007 ).");
MAYOR'S TASK FORCE REPORT, SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 6, at Executive Summary 2
("Regardless of changes to the rating systems that occur after adoption of these recommendations,
the rating systems in effect at the time of adoption of these recommendations should govern.").
262. LIVERMORE,
CAL,
MUN.
CODE
§
15.7 6.030
(2007),
available at
http://www. codepublishing. com/ca/LivermorePDF/Livermorefullcode 1109. pdf("' LEEDTMrating
system' means the most recent version of the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEEDTM ) Commercial Green Building SystemTM , or other related LEEDTM rating system, approved
by the U.S. Green Building Council") (emphasis added); BABYLON, N.Y., C oDE§ 89-84 (2008),
available athttp://www.ecode360.com/?custld=BA0924 ("The To wn of Babylon "hereby adopts, in
principle, the [U SGBC' s]
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design for New
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Scenario 3a ordinance) freezes LEED for New Construction Version 2.2 in
263
In one respect, the approach taken by San Francisco lessens
its code.
concerns of improper delegation, as it implies that (similar to a Scenario 2
ordinance) the City reviewed the requirements of LEED Version 2.2,
decided that they were satisfactory, and determined that they could be
relied upon to ensure that projects built pursuant to those standards would
help lessen impacts from climate change and improve local environmental
concerns.
However, there are also problems with this approach. For example,
assume a developer applies for a building permit in a town that requires
privately funded commercial buildings to obtain LEED Silver certification
under Version 2.2, and does so while Version 2.2 is still in effect. Further
assume that the developer then vested her right to construct the building,
but for certain reasons has not been able to continue or complete full
construction, and thus has not yet received a certificate of occupancy. In
the meantime, assume that the USGBC moves to its newly revised
standards, LEED Version 3.0. Depending on how long it takes the vested
building to be constructed and how long the USGBC agrees to continue
issuing certifications under the old Version 2.2, it is possible that the
developer may no longer be able to obtain LEED Silver certification under
Version 2.2, because the USGBC will have moved on to only offering
264
certification for compliance with LEED Version 3.0.
Perhaps a more pressing concern is that the USGBC modifies its
standards for a reason-typically to correct perceived problems with the
existing system. LEED Version 3.0, for example, addresses some of the
concerns raised in this article, including point weightings based on human
health and environmental impacts, and introduces a regional component.
By freezing in time an evolving standard, a city will miss out on positive
265
new developments such as these.
Further, as technology in this area
improves, it is likely that easier and more cost-efficient methods for
dealing with energy consumption and green building construction will be
developed. The frozen-in-time LEED-based ordinances adopted by cities
will either have to be revised in the near future, or cities will be stuck with
Construction (LEED-NC) Rating System, Version 2. 2, and, further, automatically adopts any future
versions promulgated by the USGBC.").
263. S.F. , CAL., BUILDING CODE ch. 13C, § 1304C.O (2007) (effective Nov. 1, 2008).
264. As of June 27 , 2009, all new projects registering for LEED Certification with the USGBC
must do so pursuant to LEED v. 3.0, not v. 2.2. U SGBC, LEED V3 Rollout,
https: //www. usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentiD=5176 (last visited Jan. 24, 20 10).
265. Of course, a city that has adopted, for example, LEED v. 2.2 can always amend its
ordinance to adopt LEED v. 3.0. However, this invites a host of problems, including projects
rushing to get into the pipeline so that they can be included under the old standard (if it would be
more advantageous), additional long and drawn out public hearing processes over adoption of the
new version, and additional investment of staff time and resources to learn about a new system after
having already become familiar with the prior version.
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266

an outdated methodology.
Other municipalities have opted to reference the current version of
267
LEED in their codes, as well as future versions. This Scenario3b and 6b
approach is also problematic, especially from a legal perspective. Certain
courts have found the adoption of future editions of codes to be an invalid
268
delegation. In State v. Crawford, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a
statute requiring that "'all electric wiring ... be in accordance with the
269
National Electrical Code' was void for uncertainty." Specifically, the
court had concerns that a person trying to comply with that code would not
know if the National Fire Protective Association, the private entity that
270
Such
promulgated the code, had reconvened and revised the code.
271
concerns, which were legitimate in 1919 when Crawford was decided,
are somewhat obviated in this day and age, especially with respect to the
USGBC's revisions to the LEED standards, which are easily available
272
However, the court's underlying delegation determination
online.
266. If the ordinances are added to the building code, instead of the planning or zoning code,
they will be more difficult to revise. In many states, revising local building codes is notoriously
difficult, and often requires approval from the state.
e.g.,
BABYLON,
N.Y.,
CODE
§
89 -84
(2008)
available
at
267. See,
http://www.ecode360.com/?custid=BA0924; PASADENA, CAL, MUN. CODE,§ 14.90.030(I)(Green
Building Practices, Definitions) (2008) ('"LEED's Green Building Rating System (Rating System)'
means the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green Building Rating System
approved by the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) and as that Rating System may be
amended from time to time by the USGBC." (emphasis added)), available at
http: I/library.m unicode. com/index. aspx?clien tiD= 16551 &stateiD=5&stateN ame=California.
268. State v. Crawford, 177 P. 360,361 (Kan. 1919) (finding adoption offuture editions of
codes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority); N. Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 561 P.2d
117 6, 1181 n.3 (Alaska 1977) (stating, without reaching the constitutional question of delegation,
"[a]dopting a code written by a private national organization generally does not raise delegation of
authority problems as long as the code, organization and edition are clearly specified, and no
attempt is made to adopt future amendments" (emphasis added)).
269. 177 P. at 361 (quoting the Fire Prevention Act).
270. /d. ("[T]here is no official way, indeed no practical way , for the average property owner
to know what these code rules are.").
271. See id. at 360.
272. See USGBC, LEED, http: //www.usgbc.org /DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageiD=5 1 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2009) (providing an introduction to LEED, the next version of LEED, and other
LEED information). More recently, a court found that adoption of future versions of the code via
statute is not a violation. Indep. Electricians & Elec. Contractors' Ass' n v. N.J. Bd. of Exam' rs of
Elec. Contractors, 256 A.2d 33, 42 (N.J. 1969). In Independent Electricians , the New Jersey
Supreme Court considered a state statute that required performance of electrical construction in
accordance with the standards of the National Electrical Code. !d. at 241--42. The court found that
there was no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power where the National Electrical Code
was the "standard accepted safety code in the electrical industry throughout the United States" and
where the "procedures of adoption, review and revision reflect a national consensus of
manufacturers, consumers, scientific, technical and professional organizations, and governmental
agencies." !d. at 242. Thus, a town such as Babylon, New York that has adopted future versions of
LEED into its municipal code could rely on similar arguments, noting that LEED has become the de
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remains valid and applicable:
If the Legislature desires to adopt a rule of the National
Electrical Code as a law of this state, it should copy that rule,
and give it a title and an enacting clause, and pass it through
the Senate and the House of Representatives by a
constitutional majority, and give the Governor a chance to
approve or veto it, and then hand it over to the secretary of
state 1C'or publ'1cat10n. 273
0

The court is, in effect, suggesting a Scenario 2 regime.
VII.

CONCLUSION:

So WHAT'S THE ALTERNATIVE?

Private green building requirements that rely on LEED standards would
seem to be, if nothing else, a positive first step toward alleviating local
environmental problems as well as addressing broader climate change
issues. The fact that cities are taking action at all shows that they take the
environment seriously, and believe that it is the responsibility of all parties
involved to improve it. However, the problem is that once a city has
adopted a LEED-based private green building ordinance, it will believe it
has sufficiently addressed its concerns, and move onto something else.
Instead, cities must be ready, willing, and able to modify those ordinances
as the market and technological advances lower the cost and availability of
green building mechanisms, and as technical standards emerge that better
match the environmental needs of particular localities. 274 The adoption of
green building mandates is a nascent trend, though a snowballing one.
Thus, there is still time to halt the spread of LEED-based ordinances,
which promote inefficient results achieved through less-than-legitimate
processes, and adopt a better type of ordinance.
facto national standard for green building in local municipal codes, and its revisions are conducted
through an open and collaborative process.
273. Crawford, 177 P. at 361. Such an approach would be in line with Scenario 2 ordinances.
Cf City of Syracuse v. Penny, 300 N.Y.S.2d 679, 683 , (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding there is no
invalid delegation where city adopted the National Electrical Code and incorporated it into the
city's ordinance as part of the Electric Code of the City of Syracuse).
274. Local governments should consider the cautionary tale surrounding the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) adoption of industry standards. OSHA adopted a
number of regulations that were created as national consensus standards by the American
Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists, a private industry organization. Shapiro,
supra note 134, at 401. Those regulations stuck, and they are now too entrenched to be changed,
though people now realize that the standards are weak. Specifically, workers are not substantially
protected by the standards due to the fact that the industry that drafted them was reluctant to
characterize certain substances as carcinogens (indeed, more reluctant than the governmental
organization itself would have been). THOMAS 0. McGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WoRKERS AT
RISK: THE FAilED PROMISE OF THE OcCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 283
(1993 ).
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This Article has argued that a local (not national) and public (not
private) solution is needed to ensure the greatest benefits to the
environment at the least cost to cities and developers. It has also addressed
the infeasibility of expecting cities-especially small ones with little
technical expertise or manpower-to develop their own green building
ordinances from scratch. Because of this resource problem, it may not be
possible to articulate a "best possible solution." It therefore makes sense
for all localities who wish to create a green building ordinance to start with
a basic structure, such as the LEED checklist or a similar system that has
been created by another, perhaps more local, standard-making
275
organization.
Then, by taking into account local conditions, such as
Washington, D.C.'s poor river and air quality or Nevada's drought-like
conditions and abundant sunlight, local governments, working with
276
members oflocal universities, state energy departments, or even LEED
Accredited Professionals, should determine which standards would most
effectively alleviate their locality-specific problems. Local governments
should also involve economists and modelers to determine whether the
existing standards could be augmented to better to achieve their goals
while still ensuring that projects could be feasibly constructed. Members of
the environmental community should be involved too, along with those in
the building indust!f', to ensure balance between concerns for externalities
27
Once this basic structure is in operation, localities
and internalities.
should continue to review new versions of existing standards as they are
promulgated by private organizations to determine whether any of the
changes could aid them in their local pursuit of a healthy environment and
in combating climate change.
A substantial problem with the LEED system is that the points are not
weighted, and thus developers often go with the cheaper and easier points
to achieve LEED certification, neglecting the more expensive yet
environmentally beneficial options, such as those relating to energy
27 5. Although this Article focuses on the USGBC' s LEED standards, because those are the
most widely used, there are a number of other green building standards systems that have been
promulgated, including Green Globes (owned and operated by the Green Building Initiative,
another industry-based organization), Build it Green's GreenPoint Rated system, SBTool 07 (the
software implementation of the Green Building Challenge assessment method), and the American
Institute of Architects' sustainability position statement and 16-point criteria for ratings systems.
276. For example, the University of Georgia School of Law has a land use clinic that helps
local governments develop new land use ordinances. See University of Georgia, Land Use Clinic,
http://law. uga. edu!landuseclinic/index.htrnl (last visited Jan. 28, 2010 ).
277 . Most of the larger cities that have implemented the LEED-based private green building
ordinances first formed green building "task forces," comprising government, industry, and
environmental interests. These task forces likely understood and discussed the problems and
limitations of a LEED-based system, but wanted to take action quickly and begin moving forward
with an ordinance. This does not mean that, were they to reexamine the issue, with the
understanding that they wanted to go beyond LEED, that they could not do so in a mutually
agreeable way. Telephone Interview with D. C. Neighborhood Planning Coordinator, supra note 45.
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conservation. If localities decide to create their own green building
ordinances, they should work with economists to conduct cost-benefit
analyses and to prioritize concerns. For example, if a locality has only infill
spaces that are close to public transit available for construction, but the
locality is drought-prone and water-conservation measures are a priority, it
could either: (a) make water conservation measures a prerequisite to
obtaining certification; or (b) weight the points available for water
conservation more heavily than those for less pressing concerns, such as
sustainable sites located close to public transportation. By making the
available points align more closely with local environmental costs,
developers will be able to conduct a true cost-benefit analysis.
Finally, green building ordinances must also take into account that the
greenest building is an existing building, something the current version of
LEED fails to recognize. The energy and resources that go into demolition
and new construction-even new green construction-far surpasses that
involved in renovating existing or historic buildings.
In sum, this Article shows the failings of a private green building
ordinance that relies wholly on the USGBC's LEED standards. A green
building regime should be designed to achieve two fundamental goals: (1)
efficacy-considering costs but ensuring strong green building measures so
as to combat global warming and reduce local environmental externalities
caused by buildings; and (2) legitimate process-ensuring that the
regulations implemented by local governments are subject to a process that
is legitimate, through various degrees of transparency, notice, and
opportunity for voice and exit. Finally, although private green building
ordinances can result in real environmental benefits, the two stated regime
goals will not be met if cities continue to rely only on unmodified LEED
standards as the basis of their green building regulations.
So which ofthe two buildings described at the beginning ofthis Article
is greener? If we define green by a building's local externalities, certainly
the older, existing building, which is located close to parks, downtown
amenities, and transit, is greener. People who live and work in the building
can make use of the public transit options, reducing their reliance on
individual vehicles that consume fuel and release harmful emissions.
Although its energy use and water consumption are not efficient, it is safe
to say that over the building's lifetime those losses pale in comparison to
the water and energy that would be required to demolish it and construct a
new building-even a LEED-certified one. However, if a city relies on
LEED standards, the new "energy-efficient" building, which consumed
numerous natural resources and large amounts of energy in its construction
and infrastructure needs, not to mention rezoned farmland to commercial
use, can be deemed a " green b m"ld"mg. ,278
278. While LEED points are available in the Sustainable Sites category for dense, infill
development, such development is no t a prerequisite. The argument could be made that, if a
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The choice between the two types of buildings is an important one that
cities must address. So that their green building ordinances will in fact
result in desired changes in the environment, cities must consider seriously
what types of harms they are trying to alleviate and what type of
development they want to promote. This may vary based on locality, but
the answer is the key to shaping the look and feel of our future.

building were not able to achieve many points under the Sustainable Sites category due to its non
infilllocation, it would have to do more in the other categories to reach the requisite number of
points for certification. Notably, however, even non-infill, greenfield development can receive up to
eleven out of a possible fourteen points in the Sustainable Sites category.

